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In the first chapter, All-Pay Auctions with Resale, I study equilibria of first- and second-price all-
pay auctions with resale when players’ signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. I show
that existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element to players’ valuations and
creates a signaling incentive for players. I characterize symmetric bidding equilibria for both first-
and second-price all-pay auctions with resale and provide sufficient conditions for existence of
symmetric equilibria. Under those conditions I show that second-price all-pay auctions gener-
ate no less expected revenue than first-price all-pay auctions with resale. The initial seller could
benefit from publicly disclosing her private information which is affiliated with players’ signals.
Outcome in all-pay auctions is deterministic since the highest bidder wins the prize with prob-
ability one. However, many realistic contests have in-deterministic outcome and no player can
guarantee winning the prize.
The second chapter, Rent-Seeking Contest with Private Values and Resale, studies rent-seeking
contests with private values and resale possibilities. With an in-deterministic success function,
the resulting possible inefficiency 1 creates a motive for aftermarket trade. Players’ valuations
are endogenously determined when there is an opportunity of resale. I characterize symmetric
equilibria. I assume that the winner has full bargaining power; however, the results extend to other
resale mechanisms. I show that resale enhances allocative efficiency ex post at the expense of more
wasted social resources since players compete more aggressively with resale possibilities.
In the third chapter, The Imperfectly Discriminating Contests with Incomplete Information,
I study the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests
with incomplete information. Sufficient conditions under which equilibria exist are provided for
iv
both finite-action and continuum-action cases. Using a two-bidder example, we derive some prop-
erties of equilibria and show a special case of revenue equivalence between contests with incom-
plete information and contests with complete information.
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1.0 ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH RESALE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies all-pay auctions with resale. In contrast to standard auctions where only winners
are required to make payments, all-pay auctions exhibit special characteristic of unconditional
payment, that is, bidders always pay their bids regardless of winning or losing. All-pay auctions or
equivalent models have been widely used to model a variety of economic and social instances of
conflict and competition such as lobbying, contests and tournaments, political campaigns, patent
races, and so on.1 Two formats of all-pay auctions are widely used in the existing literature: first-
price all-pay auctions and second-price all-pay auctions.2 They differ only in the winning bidders’
payment. The winning bidder pays his own bid in first-price all-pay auctions, and the highest
losing bid in second-price all-pay auctions. In both auctions, all losing bidders pay their own bids.
Hence, they are analogous to standard first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions.
Using the general symmetric model, Krishna and Morgan (1997) study all-pay auctions by
characterizing equilibrium strategies and comparing expected revenues resulting from both first-
price and second-price all-pay auctions. However, there are many instances a static all-pay auction
model could not account for. Participants in such instances often face aftermarket competition, as
in the following examples.
Patent Races. Patent races are frequently formalized as all-pay auctions since resources de-
voted by competitors are irreversible, regardless winning or losing. Winners in patent races can
either retain exclusive use of the innovations or license the innovations for use by other producers.
1See, for example, Baye et al. (1993), Krishna and Morgan (1997), and Moldovanu and Sela (2001).
2Second-price all-pay auctions are better known as the war of attrition and are used to model conflicts among
animals (Maynard Smith, 1982) and struggles for survival among firms (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986).
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When an innovation is to be patented, the winner who comes from a research institution is very
likely to sell the patent to interested producers. On the demand side, an incumbent monopolist
possessing related or substitutable technology has more incentive than a potential entrant to buy
the patent.3 Hence, very often there is a secondary market for patents. In a broader view, the
resale of patented technology takes place all over the world. In particular, the transfer of patented
technology from developed countries to developing ones promotes the economic performances of
the latter. This could be evidenced by the development of many east Asian countries.4
Lobbying. Rent-seeking activities such as lobbying play an important role in the allocation of
government contracts. Lobbyists make implicit payments to politicians through campaign contri-
butions or other channels in order to influence political decisions. Lobbying is usually formalized
as an all-pay auction since lobbyists’ up-front payments are not refundable to those failing to win
the prize. Again there is aftermarket competition in lobbying. Successful lobbyists often use sub-
contracting to reduce their production costs that are, in particular, strictly convex.5
Waiting-Line Competition. The allocation procedures based on a first-come-first-served princi-
ple could be considered as waiting-line competitions. Examples include allocating tickets of sports
or concerts, foods or other necessities with scarcity, university parking lots or day-care services,
discounted commodities, and so on. These waiting-line allocation procedures are often formalized
as all-pay auctions, since players are involved in costly competition in some non-price dimensions
for a limited number of prizes. Regardless of winning or losing, players’ effort is sunk. Although
resale is usually not allowed, in practice, speculative behaviors are prevalent. For instance, peo-
ple with lower time cost could wait in line and profit by reselling the objects to those with higher
opportunity cost of time.6
The above examples show that many realistic situations could be best analyzed through a model
that incorporates resale possibilities into all-pay auctions. It remains open to characterize players’
3By doing this the monopolist could maintain market power, whereas competition results if the entrant obtains the
patent. See Gilbert and Newbery (1982).
4I thank John Morgan for pointing out this example to me.
5For general results regarding subcontracting, please refer to Kamine et al. (1989) and Gale et al. (2000).
6 For example, near the end of each year in China, a large number of migrant workers have to pay much more for
train tickets than their face value in order to go back to their hometown for family reunion during the Chinese New
Year. The middlemen, or huangniu (yellow bulls), who have lower opportunity cost of time would wait in line and
make illegal profits by reselling the tickets to those who long for going home but have no time waiting in line to buy
the tickets.
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behaviors in all-pay auctions with resale. Intuitively existence of resale possibilities exhibits influ-
ence on bidders’ bidding behaviors in the first stage. The aftermarket buyers usually have access
to information revealed by the initial seller, such as submitted bids. If the submitted bids reveal
private information of primary bidders, resale price will be responsive to those bids and a bidder’s
resale profit can depend on the bid he makes in the primary auction. Therefore, resale possibili-
ties introduce an endogenous element to bidders’ valuations upon winning the auction and creates
an incentive for primary bidders to signal their private information to aftermarket buyers. This
information connection between resale price and submitted bids is our primary focus.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of resale possibilities on bidders’
bidding behaviors and the resulting expected revenues from both first- and second-price all-pay
auctions. This paper considers a two-stage model in which an all-pay auction in the first stage is
followed by resale. For the first stage, we analyze both first- and second-price all-pay auctions.
For the second stage, we do not specify a resale mechanism and simply assume that resale is
conducted through a competitive market. Therefore, winners of the first-stage auction have no
bargaining power and can only affect their profits by signalling their private information through
bids. This assumption could be relaxed if there is only one aftermarket buyer. For multiple buyers,
this assumption is justified if interested buyers come to the market randomly and each proposes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the winner.7 In certain industries such as automobile and electronics,
subcontracting is based on competitive bids.8
We extend Krishna and Morgan (1997)’s general symmetric setting to incorporate resale pos-
sibilities into all-pay auctions. We characterize symmetric bidding equilibria for both first- and
second-price all-pay auctions with resale. Based on these equilibria, we compare the two for-
mats from the perspective of a revenue-maximizing seller. In addition, we examine the impact of
information disclosure of the initial seller.
This paper is related to the literature regarding auctions with resale. Bikhchandani and Huang
(1989) present a closely related model with symmetric information applicable to treasury bill auc-
tions, where pure common values and a competitive resale market are assumed. Resale takes place
because most bidders in the first stage are speculators and bid for resale. They characterize equilib-
7In equilibrium, such offer will be accepted by the winner. It makes more sense if the winner discounts future
payoff more than the buyer does.
8The point is that subcontracting is used to reduce costs if we assume production cost is strictly convex.
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rium bidding strategies for both discriminatory and uniform-price auctions. Provided symmetric
equilibria exist, they show that uniform-price auctions generate no less expected revenue than dis-
criminatory auctions. We study all-pay auctions with resale using a similar model, but we allow
bidders’ valuations to be interdependent.
Using a model with independent private values, Haile (2003) studies auctions with resale under
private uncertainties. Resale takes place because of the discrepancy between the estimated values
at the time of bidding and the true values realized after the auction. He characterizes equilibrium
bidding strategies for first-price, second-price and English auctions followed by resale which could
be formalized as an optimal auction or an English auction. He argues that the option to resell
creates endogenous valuations and induces signaling incentives that may reverse the revenue results
obtained in the literature that assumes no resale.9 Assuming positively correlated signals and
interdependent valuations, we show that second-price all-pay auctions generate no less expected
revenue than first-price all-pay auctions with resale possibilities.
The rest of this paper is organized as following. Section 1.2 contains the model. Section
1.3 and 1.4 study second-price and first-price all-pay auctions respectively. Section 1.5 provides
ranking of expected revenues of these two auction formats. Section 1.6 examines the effect of
information disclosure. Section 1.7 concludes. The appendix contains all proofs.
1.2 THE MODEL
The game proceeds as following. In the first stage, N risk-neutral bidders compete for an indi-
visible good in an all-pay auction–either first-price or second-price. The bidder who submits the
highest bid wins the object and pays either his own bid or the highest losing bid, depending on the
exogenously chosen auction format. All losing bidders pay their own bids. Due to institutional or
other reasons, there are some bidders who cannot participate in the first-stage competition.10 How-
ever, they will try to obtain the object through aftermarket bargaining with the winner. Therefore,
9A similar signalling incentive is also examined in Goeree (2003).
10Some bidders may not be eligible to participate in certain competition for a special prize, say an monopoly
privilege. Some bidders may be excluded by strategic behaviors of a revenue-maximizing seller. See an example in
Section 5.
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after the primary auction is over, there is possibility for resale.
In the second stage, potential buyers approach the primary winner in order to obtain the object.
We assume that those losers from the first stage do not participate in the aftermarket competition.
Actually in our symmetric setting of the game, if the equilibrium strategies are nondecreasing,
there is no potential gain for resale taking place within the same group of bidders. On the other
hand, it is likely that the valuation of certain aftermarket buyer exceeds that of primary winner,
therefore there may be potential gain to be realized if new entrants bargain with the first-stage
winner.
After the first-stage auction is over, we assume that the initial seller announces the winning
bid and the highest losing bid.11 Based on the released information, aftermarket buyers could infer
the private information held by the first-stage winner. To focus on the information transmission
given resale possibilities, we assume that resale price will be the expected first-stage winner’s
valuation of the object conditional on all publicly available information. Therefore, the seller has
no bargaining power.
For the first-stage all-pay auction, we follow the framework and notation of Krishna and Mor-
gan (1997) to make the analysis consistent with the literature. Prior to auction each bidder i receives
a private signal, Xi, that affects value of the object Vi defined as:
Vi =V (S,Xi,{X j} j 6=i) (1.1)
where S = (S1,S2, ...,Sm) are any other random variables that influence the valuation but are not
observed by any bidder. We assume that V is non-negative, continuous, increasing in all its vari-
ables. For each i, E[Vi] < ∞. Moreover, all bidders’ valuations depend on S in the same manner,
and each bidder’s valuation is a symmetric function of other bidders’ signals.
Let X0 be private information held by the initial seller who may or may not reveal it. Let
f (S,X0,X1,X2, ...,Xn) be the joint density of random variables S,X0,X1,X2, ...,XN , where f is sym-
metric in bidders’ signals. We assume that f satisfies the affiliation inequality:
f (z∨ z′) f (z∧ z′)≥ f (z) f (z′) (1.2)
11This information release procedure is standard in most auction literature. Although interesting, the optimal infor-
mation disclosure is not addressed in this paper. Calzolari and Pavan (2006) studies optimal information disclosure for
a monopolist who cannot commit to prevent resale.
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where z∨ z′ denotes the component-wise maximum of z and z′ and z∧ z′ denotes the component-
wise minimum of z and z′. Roughly, this means that a high value of one of the variables, S j or Xi,
makes it more likely that the other variables also take on high values. Let [0, s¯]m× [0, x¯0]× [0, x¯]n
be the support of f , where [0, x¯]n denotes the n-fold product of [0, x¯].
Let fY1(·|x) denote the conditional density of Y1, where Y1 =max{X j} j 6=1, given X1 = x. Stan-
dard results from Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that X1 and Y1 are also affiliated. Through-
out the paper, we make use of the following facts: FY1(y|x) and
fY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|x)
are non-increasing in
x.12 Moreover, if H is any nondecreasing function, affiliation implies that h(a1,b1; ...,an,bn) =
E[H(X1, ...,Xn)|a1 ≤ X1 ≤ b1, ...,an ≤ Xn ≤ bn] is nondecreasing in all of its arguments. For sim-
plicity, we also assume that if H is continuously differentiable, then E[H(X1, ...,Xn|a1 ≤ X1 ≤
b1, ...,an ≤ Xn ≤ bn] is also continuously differentiable in all its arguments.13
A pure strategy for bidder i is a measurable function, βi : [0, x¯]→ R. Such a pure strategy is
monotone if x′ ≥ x implies βi(x′)≥ βi(x).
An N-tuple of pure strategies, (β1, ...,βn) is an equilibrium if for every bidder i and every pure
strategy β′i,
EUi(β(x),x)≥ EUi(β′i(x),β−i(x−i),x) (1.3)
where the left-hand side, is bidder i’s expected utility given the joint strategy β, and the right-hand
side is his expected utility when he employs β′i and the others employ β−i.
The equilibrium is symmetric if β1 = · · ·βN = β. Since bidders are ex ante identical, we are
considering symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies.
1.3 SECOND-PRICE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH RESALE
We first characterize the symmetric equilibrium for second-price all-pay auction with resale. With-
out loss of generality, we analyze the game from bidder 1’s point of view. When bidder 1 submits
his bid, he only observes his own private signal X1.
12In the appendix, we provide the detailed proof for these facts.
13For more details about affiliation, please refer to Milgrom and Weber (1982).
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According to our assumption, buyers on the secondary market observe only publicly an-
nounced information and resale price is the expectation of the primary winner’s valuation con-
ditional on all public information. It is useful to begin with a heuristic derivation of the first-order
condition for βs to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium in strictly increasing and differentiable strate-
gies.14
Suppose bidders j 6= 1 follow the symmetric equilibrium strategy βs. Suppose bidder 1 receives
a private signal X1 = x and bids b. If bidder 1 wins with a bid b and the secondary market buyers
believe that he is following βs, the resale price will be
P(β−1s (b),Y1) = E[V1|X1 = β−1s (b),Y1] (1.4)
where β−1s denotes the inverse of βs and Y1 is the first-order statistic of (X2, ...,XN). When bidder
1 wins the object and buyers on the secondary market believe that his private signal is equal to x′,
the expected resale price conditional on X1 and Y1 is:
v(x′,x,y)≡ E[P(x′,Y1)|X1 = x,Y1 = y] (1.5)
By affiliation, both P and v are non-decreasing in all their arguments. With this notation, the
expected payoff for bidder 1 is:
Π(b,x) =
Z β−1s (b)
0
(v(β−1s (b),x,y)−βs(y)) fY1(y|x)dy− [1−FY1(β−1s (b)|x)]b (1.6)
Maximizing (6) with respect to b yields the first-order condition
0 =
1
β′s(β
−1
s (b))
v(β−1s (b),x,β
−1
s (b)) fY1(β
−1
s (b)|x)
+
1
β′s(β
−1
s (b))
Z β−1s (b)
0
v1(β−1s (b),x,y) fY1(y|x)dy]
−[1−FY1(β−1s (b)|x)]
where v1 is the partial derivative with respect to β−1s (b).
At a symmetric equilibrium, it is optimal that βs(x) = b, then we have
β′s(x) = v(x,x,x)
fY1(x|x)
1−FY1(x|x)
+
Z x
0
v1(x,x,y)
fY1(y|x)
1−FY1(x|x)
dy (1.7)
14We will show later that the equilibrium strategy is indeed strictly increasing and differentiable.
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The solution with the boundary condition βs(0) = 0 is:
βs(x) =
Z x
0
v(t, t, t)
fY1(t|t)
1−FY1(t|t)
dt+
Z x
0
k(u)du (1.8)
where k(u) =
R u
0 v1(u,u,y)
fY1(y|u)
1−FY1(u|u)
dy.
This is only necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium. For sufficiency, we need the
following assumption.
Assumption 1. Let ψ : R3 → R be defined by ψ(x′,x,y) = v(x′,x,y) fY1(y|x)1−FY1(y|x) . We assume that for
all y, (i) ψ2 > 0, and (ii) ψ12 > 0.
Given the above assumption, we have the following result.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1 hold, then a symmetric equilibrium of second-price all-pay
auction with resale is given by βs defined as
βs(x) =
Z x
0
v(t, t, t)
fY1(t|t)
1−FY1(t|t)
dt+
Z x
0
k(u)du
where k(u) =
R u
0 v1(u,u,y)
fY1(y|u)
1−FY1(u|u)
dy.
Remark 1. Assumption 1 is restrictive and critical to the sufficiency result. Note that affiliation
implies that
fY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|x)
is non-increasing in x, and v(x′,x,y) is non-decreasing in x for every y.
Therefore, part (i) ensures that the affiliation between X1 and Y1 is not so strong that it overwhelms
the increase in the expected valuation of the object, v(x′,x,y), resulting from a higher signal x.
Part (ii) is needed to ensure that the responsiveness of resale price and primary bidders’ signalling
incentive are increasing in signal.
Example 1. Suppose N = 2. Let f (x,y) = 49(2+ xy) on [0,1]
2, and v(x′,x,y) = x′x+ 12y. Simple
manipulation yields fy(y|x) = 4+2xy4+x , and FY (y|x) = 4y+xy
2
4+x . Then we have
ψ(x′,x,y) = v(x′,x,y)
fY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|x)
=
(2x′x+ y)(2+ xy)
4+ x−4y− xy2
It can be verified that all conditions in Assumption 1 is satisfied.
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Using a variation of part (i) of Assumption 1, Krishna and Morgan (1997) derive sufficient
condition for a symmetric equilibrium of second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition) without
resale. In their context, v(x,y) = E[V1|X1 = x,Y1 = y], and the symmetric equilibrium is given by:
αs(x) =
Z x
0
v(t, t)
fY1(t|t)
1−FY1(t|t)
dt (1.9)
To ensure it is indeed a symmetric equilibrium, they assume that φ(·,y) is increasing for all y,
where φ(x,y)≡ v(x,y) fY1(y|x)1−FY1(y|x) .
Examining both equilibria, we could observe that βs(x) reduces to αs(x) if there is no resale
possibilities and the primary bidders have no incentive to signal. Resale possibilities introduce an
endogenous element to primary bidders’ valuation since bidders’ resale profit depend on the bids
they make in the primary auction. Hence primary bidders have incentives to signal their private
information to aftermarket buyers. They signal in order to convince aftermarket buyers that the
object is of high value since resale price is responsive to the announced bids. This responsiveness
is measured by v1; v1 is nonnegative and increasing in x due to affiliation and Assumption 1.
From the analysis above, we can conclude that the information disclosing policy is crucial to
our characterization. In second-price all-pay auctions with resale, if only the highest losing bid
(price paid by the winner) is revealed, primary bidders’ signalling incentive will be reduced since
the winning bid conveys private information for the first-stage winner. On the other hand, if the
initial seller releases more information, the expected resale price will not decrease, may increase
based on more information. This increases the expected valuation of bidders upon winning, hence
they will bid more aggressively than otherwise.
1.4 FIRST-PRICE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH RESALE
The analysis is parallel to previous section. Again we begin with a heuristic derivation of equi-
librium. Suppose bidders j 6= 1 follow the symmetric equilibrium strategy β f . Suppose bidder 1
receives a private signal X1 = x and bids b. If bidder 1 wins with a bid b and aftermarket buyers
believe that he is following β f , slightly abusing notation yields
P(β−1f (b),Y1) = E[V1|X1 = β−1f (b),Y1]
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where β−1f denotes the inverse of β f . When bidder 1 wins the object and buyers on the secondary
market believe that his private signal is equal to x′, the expected resale price conditional on X1 and
Y1 is:
v(x′,x,y)≡ E[P(x′,Y1)|X1 = x,Y1 = y]
By affiliation, both P and v are non-decreasing in all their arguments. With this notation, the
expected payoff for bidder 1 is
Π(b,x) =
Z β−1f (b)
0
v(β−1f (b),x,y) fY1(y|x)dy−b (1.10)
Maximizing (10) with respect to b yields the first-order condition:
0 = v(β−1f (b),x,β
−1
f (b)) fY1(β
−1
f (b)|x)
1
β′f (β
−1
f (b))
+
1
β′f (β
−1
f (b))
Z β−1f (b)
0
v1(β−1f (b),x,y) fY1(y|x)dy−1
where β′f is the first derivative of β f , and v1(β
−1
f (b),x,y) is the partial derivative of v with respect
to its first argument.
At a symmetric equilibrium, β f (x) = b and thus
β′f (x) = v(x,x,x) fY1(x|x)+
Z x
0
v1(x,x,y) fY1(y|x)dy (1.11)
The solution to equation (11) with the boundary condition β f (0) = 0 is:
β f (x) =
Z x
0
v(t, t, t) fY1(t|t)dt+
Z x
0
h(u)du (1.12)
where h(u) =
R u
0 v1(u,u,y) fY1(y|u)dy.
The derivation is heuristic since (11) is only a necessary condition. For the sufficiency, we
need additional restriction like Assumption 1. Let Φ : R3 → R be defined by
Φ(x′,x,y) = v(x′,x,y) fY1(y|x)
One implication of Assumption 1 leads to the following lemma. The argument makes use of
the fact that FY1(y|x) is non-increasing in x, and proof is contained in appendix.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 hold. Then for all y, we have (i) Φ2 > 0, and (ii) Φ12 > 0.
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With Lemma 1, we can show that the equilibrium we characterize is indeed a symmetric equi-
librium.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumption 1 hold, then a symmetric equilibrium in first-price all-pay auc-
tions with resale is given by β f defined as
β f (x) =
Z x
0
v(t, t, t) fY1(t|t)dt+
Z x
0
h(u)du
where h(u) =
R u
0 v1(u,u,y) fY1(y|u)dy.
For first-price all-pay auctions without resale, Krishna and Morgan (1997) characterize a sym-
metric equilibrium:
α f (x) =
Z x
0
v(t, t) fY1(t|t)dt (1.13)
To ensure it is indeed a symmetric equilibrium, they assume that ϕ(·,y) is increasing for all y,
where ϕ(x,y)≡ v(x,y) fY1(y|x).15
Examining both equilibria, we find that β f (x) reduces to α f (x) if there is no resale possi-
bility and primary bidders have no incentive to signal. As we argue in previous section, resale
possibilities introduce an endogenous element to primary bidders’ valuation since bidders’ resale
profit depend on the bids they make in the primary auction. Hence primary bidders have incen-
tives to signal their private information to aftermarket buyers. The implication of Assumption 1,
say Lemma 1, ensures that the responsiveness of resale price to announced bids (measured by v1)
increases with a bidder’s private signal. This further guarantees that each bidder’s incentive to
signal increases with his private signal. Without resale, only Φ2 > 0 is needed to characterize the
symmetric equilibrium.
Because of responsiveness of resale price to announced bids, the information disclosing policy
affects primary bidders’ bidding behaviors. Affiliation implies that resale price is non-decreasing
in all bidders’ private signals. Therefore, the first-stage bidders may bid more aggressively if
the initial seller announces more bids. If the initial seller announces less information, bidders’
incentives to signal their private information will be reduced.
15Krishna and Morgan (1997) show that for all y, that φ(·,y) is increasing implies ϕ(·,y) is increasing.
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1.5 REVENUE COMPARISON
In this section, we investigate the performance of first- and second-price all-pay auctions with
resale in terms of expected revenue accruing to the initial seller. Given the symmetric equilibria
we characterize, which auction format is better from the perspective of a revenue-maximizing
seller? Without resale, Krishna and Morgan (1997) derive a revenue ranking between these two
auction formats: second-price all-pay auctions generate no less expected revenue than first-price
all-pay auctions.16 The following subsection examines whether this ranking remains true with
resale possibilities.
1.5.1 TWO ALL-PAY AUCTION FORMATS WITH RESALE
First, let us compare the expected revenue generated by both auction formats at symmetric equi-
libria.
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumption 1 hold. With resale possibilities, the expected revenue from
second-price all-pay auction is greater than or equal to that from first-price all-pay auction at the
symmetric equilibria.
The proof is contained in the appendix. Here we provide an intuitive explanation using linkage
principle. Milgrom and Weber (1982) originally introduce linkage principle to auction literature
in order to derive the revenue ranking among first-price, second-price, and English auction when
signals are affiliated and valuations are interdependent. One of the implications is that the expected
revenue from second-price auctions is no less than that from first-price auctions. Krishna and Mor-
gan (1997) further apply linkage principle to all-pay auctions and show that this ranking remains
true if we require all bidders pay their bids. Theorem 3 further implies that this revenue rank-
ing maintains when there are resale possibilities. The common thread running through is linkage
principle.
Consider the auctions as revelation games, then the selling price (the revenue of seller) could
depend only on the bids or bidders’ reports, and on the seller’s information. Then if the winner’s
16They further show that second-price all-pay auctions generate no less expected revenue than second-price auc-
tions, and first-price all-pay auctions generate no less expected revenue than first-price auctions.
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payment depend on the second-highest bidder’s signal, which is affiliated with the winner’s private
signal, the expected payment would be statistically linked to that information. As a result of
affiliation, this linkage reduces the information rent the seller must leave to bidders to induce
truthful revelation of private information. For a fixed bid, a higher private signal of the winner
means that the second highest signal is more likely to take on high values, so the expected payment
of the winner is also higher. Hence, the linkage makes the expected price paid in equilibrium by
the winner increase more steeply as a function of his signal than otherwise. By our boundary
condition, a bidder with the lowest type pays nothing, then a steeper expected payment function
yields higher expected prices. This is the intuition behind the revenue ranking result. Clearly this
linkage still works when resale is allowed.
To see how the linkage principle work, suppose bidder 1 learns his private signal as x, but bids
as if it were z. Let ek(z,x) denote the expected payment made by bidder 1 in the k-price all-pay
auction with resale, where k = { f ,s}.
Krishna and Morgan (1997) derive a variation of linkage principle that is more useful in our
model of all-pay auctions with resale.
Proposition 1. Suppose L andM are two auction mechanisms with symmetric increasing equilibria
such that the expected payment of a bidder with the lowest signal is 0. If for all x, eM2 (x,x)≥ eL2(x,x)
then for all x, eM(x,x)≥ eL(x,x).
To see how this principle works, let R(z,x) denote the expected value received by bidder 1.
Then
R(z,x) =
Z z
0
v(z,x,y) fY1(y|x)dy (1.14)
Indeed, this expression is the same for both all-pay auction forms at the symmetric equilibria.
Then the expected payoff for bidder 1 is:
Πk(z,x) = R(z,x)− ek(z,x) (1.15)
In equilibrium, it is optimal to choose z = x, and the first-order condition yields e f1(x,x) =
es1(x,x), where e
k
1(x,x) is the derivative of e
k(z,x) with respect to z evaluated at z= x.
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Note that we have
ek(z,x) =
e
f (z) = β f (z), if k = fR z
0 βs(y) fY1(y|x)dy+[1−FY1(z|x)]βs(z), if k = s
Taking the derivative with respect to x, it is trivial to show that e f2(z,x) = 0 and
es2(z,x) =−
∂
∂x
Z z
0
β′s(y)FY1(y|x)dy≥ 0
since FY1(y|x) is non-increasing in x due to affiliation. Applying Proposition 1, we have es(x,x)≥
e f (x,x) since es(0,0) = e f (0,0) = 0.
Therefore, the initial seller could benefit from exogenously choosing second-price instead of
first-price all-pay auctions if resale is allowed.
Recall Example 1: Let f (x,y) = 49(2+ xy) on [0,1]
2, and v(x′,x,y) = x′x+ 12y.
Based on the equilibrium strategies derived above, We have:
R f = 2
Z 1
0
Z x
0
3t4+ t3+8t2+2t
4+ t
dtdx
and
Rs = 2
Z 1
0
Z x
0
3t4+ t3+8t2+2t
4+ t
θdtdx
where θ= 1−Ft(t|x)1−Ft(t|t) . Therefore, we have Rs ≥ R f since θ≥ 1 when x≥ t.
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1.5.2 DOES RESALE BENEFIT SELLER?
There are still some questions to be explored. First, if the seller can commit to allow resale or not,
should he allow resale? Under what conditions does the existence of an active secondary market
benefit the initial seller?17 Generally, if the first-stage winner has access to some potential buyers
to bargain, primary participants not only compete for the object, but also compete for the right
to resell. By signalling their private information, they bid more aggressively than without resale
possibilities.
Second, does a revenue-maximizing seller have incentive to exclude some bidders from the
first stage competition, forcing them to the secondary market? This question remains open with
affiliated signals and interdependent values.
Baye et al. (1993) present an interesting exclusion principle: a revenue maximizing politi-
cian may find it in his best interest to exclude lobbyists with valuations above a threshold from
participating in the all-pay auction. Since values are public information, the exclusion makes the
competition more even and bidders submit higher bids, which in turn increases the initial seller’s
expected revenue. Bose and Deltas (1999) study English auction with two distinct types of poten-
tial bidders: consumers who bid for their own consumption and speculators who bid for resale.
They show that, if the speculators have access to a larger market of consumers than the seller, then
the seller prefer to prevent the consumers from participating in the auction.
1.6 INFORMATION DISCLOSURE BY THE INITIAL SELLER
Very often the initial seller has private information that may affect bidders’ valuation or private
information. Suppose the initial seller has private signal X0 that is affiliated with all bidders’
signals. Now consider how equilibria in all-pay auctions are affected when the initial seller publicly
reveals X0. Conditional on X0 = x0, we could derive the symmetric equilibria for both second-price
and first-price all-pay auctions with resale.
17Calzolari and Pavan (2006) show that a monopolist benefits from the existence of resale market when he cannot
contract with all potential buyers and he can prohibit the winner from reselling to the losers. However, the monopolist
will get hurt if resale cannot be banned and takes place among the same group of bidders.
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Before stating the results, we need more notations. Let β˜k(·,x0) be a symmetric equilibrium
bidding strategy conditional on X0 = x0, k = { f ,s}. Define
P(β˜−1k (b,x0),Y1,X0) = E[V1|X1 = β˜−1k (b,x0),Y1,X0 = x0] (1.16)
as the resale price if bidder 1 wins the auction with a bid b, and aftermarket buyers believe that he
is following β˜k(·,x0). Similarly, define
v˜(x′,x,y,x0) = E[P(x′,Y1,X0)|X1 = x,Y1 = y,X0 = x0] (1.17)
as the expected resale price conditional on X1,Y1 and X0. To derive the symmetric equilibria given
X0 = x0, a modification of Assumption 1 is needed.
Assumption 2. Let ψ˜ : R4 → R be defined by ψ˜(x′,x,y,x0) = v˜(x′,x,y,x0) fY1(y|x,x0)1−FY1(y|x,x0) . We assume
that for all y, (i) ψ˜2 > 0, ψ˜4 > 0, and (ii) ψ˜12 > 0, ψ˜14 > 0.
By the same argument as Lemma 1, we have
Lemma 2. Let Φ˜ : R4 → R be defined by Φ˜(x′,x,y,x0) = v˜(x′,x,y,x0) fY1(y|x,x0). Suppose As-
sumption 2 hold, then for all y, (i) Φ˜2 > 0,Φ˜4 > 0, and (ii) Φ˜12 > 0, Φ˜14 > 0.
As we characterize the symmetric equilibria without information about the seller’s private
signal, we could derive the symmetric equilibria conditional on seller’s private information for
both auction formats.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 2 hold. Conditional on the seller’s private signal X0, a sym-
metric equilibrium in second-price all-pay auctions with resale is given by β˜s defined as
β˜s(x,x0) =
Z x
0
v˜(t, t, t,x0)
fY1(t|t,x0)
1−FY1(t|t,x0)
dt+
Z x
0
k˜(u)du (1.18)
where k˜(u) =
R u
0 v˜1(u,u,y,x0)
fY1(y|u,x0)
1−FY1(u|u,x0)
dy.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 2 hold. Conditional on the seller’s private signal X0, a sym-
metric equilibrium in first-price all-pay auctions with resale is given by β˜ f defined as
β˜ f (x,x0) =
Z x
0
v˜(t, t, t,x0) fY1(t|t,x0)dt+
Z x
0
h˜(u)du (1.19)
where h˜(u) =
R u
0 v˜1(u,u,y,x0) fY1(y|u,x0)dy.
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Remark 2. Note that the equilibrium bidding function β˜ now maps two variables into a bid. For
any fixed value of X0, the equilibrium bidding strategy is a function of bidder’s private signal
only and is similar to β. Affiliation between X0 and (X1, ...,XN), Assumption 2 and Lemma 2
guarantee that the equilibrium bidding function β˜ is increasing as X0 increases. Conditional on
X0, primary bidders signal their private information to aftermarket buyers through their bids. The
responsiveness of resale price to announced bids and information increases as the realization of a
bidder’s private signal.
An immediate implication of affiliation and Assumption 2 is that the initial seller could benefit
from publicly releasing his private signal.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption 2 hold. A policy of publicly revealing the initial seller’s
private information cannot lower, and may raise the expected revenue for the seller in all-pay
auctions with resale.
The intuition underlying this result can be best understood through linkage principle. Publicly
releasing his private signal, the initial seller establishes a link between the bids submitted and that
signal. This additional link reduces the information rent enjoyed by the bidders possessing private
information. Hence, the revenue-enhancing result follows as a consequence of linkage principle.
Therefore, releasing the seller’s private signal has similar effect as releasing more bids.
Obviously Proposition 4 relies crucially on Assumption 2. If Assumption 2 fails to hold,
β˜(x,x0) may not be an increasing function of x0 because the marginal effect of the bid on the re-
sale price may be reduced and revealing X0 may reduce the bidders’ incentive to signal, and then
lower the expected revenue for the seller even though X0,X1, ...,XN are affiliated. Extremely, if X0
contains all the relevant information in X1,X2, ...,XN , there will be no signaling incentive for the
bidders, and the expected price in all-pay auctions will be lower than otherwise. The various infor-
mation structure and corresponding optimal information disclosure policy is technically complex
and remains open. Intuitively the optimal information disclosure policy depends on the specific
resale mechanism and the distribution of bargaining power between the winner and aftermarket
buyers.18
18Calzolari and Pavan (2006) studies optimal information disclosure for a monopolist who cannot commit to prevent
resale.
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1.7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies all-pay auctions with resale. Costly competitions over a limited number of
prizes are often followed by aftermarket interaction, as winners of patent races sell or license
patents to other producers. We find that introducing resale possibilities changes bidders’ behaviors
in all-pay auctions. The information connection between the resale prices and the bids submitted
by the first-stage bidders creates signalling incentive for primary bidders. We provide sufficient
conditions under which symmetric equilibria exist and characterize equilibria strategies. Provided
the existence of symmetric equilibria, we show that second-price all-pay auctions generate no less
expected revenue than first-price all-pay auctions with resale. Furthermore, if the bidders’ signals
are affiliated to the initial seller’s private signal, the seller could enhance his expected revenue by
publicly disclosing that information.
Several extensions of this model are as following. First, we do not explicitly formalize the
resale mechanism. We simply assume that the resale price equals to the expected valuation of
the winner in the first stage. In practice, the resale mechanism could be another auction, or a
multilateral bargaining. Intuitively different resale mechanisms and the distribution of bargaining
power will affect the split of resale surplus between resale seller and buyers, and in turn affect the
bidding strategies adopted by primary bidders.19
Second, we assume that the initial seller announce the winning bid and the highest losing bid
after the primary auction. Obviously different information disclosing policies have different im-
pacts on the significance of information linkage between resale price and submitted bids. The
signalling behavior relies on the announcement of winning bids. Therefore, it remains a challeng-
ing question to investigate the optimal information disclosing policy from the seller’s perspective.
From the standpoint of mechanism design, the optimal auction with resale may also depend on
the information disclosing policy. The characterization of optimal selling mechanism with resale
seems to be another challenging exercise.20
19Using an asymmetric two-bidder independent private value model, Hafalir and Krishna (2006) characterize the
equilibrium bidding strategies when resale takes place via monopoly pricing. They also show that the results could
easily extend to other resale mechanisms such as monopsony pricing and a probabilistic k-double auction.
20 Ausubel and Cramton (1999) consider an optimal multi-unit auction with efficient secondary market. Zheng
(2002) extends Myerson (1981)’s optimal auction design to the case in which resale cannot be prevented. Lebrun
(2005) shows that the second-price auction with resale implements Myerson’s optimal auction.
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Third, we assume that the first-stage losers do not participate in aftermarket competition. Re-
sale takes place when new entrants come to the market. If there are a fixed number of competitors,
it will be interesting to examine the optimal excluding policy from the seller’s perspective. We
provide a simple example to illustrate that the seller may find in his best interest to exclude one
bidder randomly. A more general analysis is worth exploring.
A special characteristic of all-pay auctions lies in the deterministic winning probabilities.
Many interesting instances, however, have stochastic allocation of the objects. If the winning
probability is stochastic, the more a bidder bids, the higher the probability he wins. But he never
guarantees winning. Then the allocation will be ex post inefficient with positive probability. It
will be worth investigating whether resale enhances allocative efficiency and compare expected
revenue resulting from the deterministic model with that resulting from the stochastic model.21
21Using a simple two-bidder-two-value stochastic model, Sui (2006) shows that resale enhances allocative efficiency
and increases expected revenue for the seller as long as the winner has more bargaining power than the loser.
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2.0 CONTESTS WITH PRIVATE VALUES AND RESALE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Situations in which competitors expend costly and irreversible resources to win a limited num-
ber of prizes are ubiquitous. Since Tullock’s (1975, 1980) seminal contribution, the theory of
rent-seeking contests has advanced considerably.1 Most literature studying Tullock’s rent-seeking
contest assumes stochastic success function, in the sense that the winning probability of a player
is proportional to her expenditure relative to the total expenditure. The more one spends, the more
likely he will win the prize. But he can never guarantee winning even if he spends the most. There-
fore, the allocation of the prize is stochastic and thus inefficient ex post with positive probability.
This is true even if competitors are ex ante identical and follow symmetric strategies in equilibrium.
The possibility of ex post inefficiency lies in the stochastic winning probability and it leaves
space for potential gain through aftermarket trade–resale. Indeed, many realistic characteristics of
rent-seeking contests cannot be captured by a static Tullock model. For instance, the prize in rent-
seeking contests could be a patented innovation. If a cost-reducing innovation is to be patented, the
incumbent monopolist holding related or substitutable technology has more incentive to acquire
the patent than a potential entrant. Then the winner could benefit from selling the patent to the
incumbent monopolist. If the rent is a certain operating license that is usually not allowed to sell,
the loser could obtain the license by taking over the whole company holding it. If the rent relates
to government contracts, like defense contracts, the winner could benefit through subcontracting
with the losing rival. In all above situations, the winner may not have the highest valuation due to
the stochastic success function. Hence, the winner has incentive to resell the prize to those having
higher valuations in order to seek additional profit.
1See Nitzan (1994) for an excellent survey.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of allowing resale on players’ strategic be-
haviors and seller’s expected revenue. Malueg and Yates (2004) were the first to study rent-seeking
contests with two-sided private information. Using a two-player-two-value model, they character-
ize the equilibrium strategies and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium. This paper follows the same model and introduce resale possibility into the standard
rent-seeking contests with private information.
Resale possibilities introduce an endogenous element to players’ valuations. Upon winning,
a low-value player could resell the prize to his rival who may have higher valuation with positive
probability. Similarly, a high-value loser may benefit from trading with a low-value winner, de-
pending on the distribution of bargaining power. This changes both players’ strategic behaviors
since they will incorporate this additional opportunities of buying and selling when they formulate
their outlay of effort. We characterize the symmetric equilibrium and find an interesting propor-
tional difference property. At symmetric equilibrium, both players compete more aggressively and
thus increase expected revenue for the seller. Moreover, if the seller could commit to publicly
disclosing players’ private values, s/he could further increase his or her expected revenue.
Introducing resale possibility to the standard rent-seeking contests will improve allocative effi-
ciency ex post. This is straightforward if both players have two valuations. If both players have the
same valuation about the prize, the allocation is always efficient. Whenever they value the prize
differently, there will be positive probability that the ex post allocation is inefficient. Indeed, if
a low-value player competes with a high-value rival and wins the prize, there is potential gain if
he resells the prize to the high-value rival. The resale price will be determined by their relative
bargaining power. For analytical simplicity, we assume that the winner has full bargaining power.
However, we can show that our results are robust to other resale mechanisms, like monopsony
pricing resale or probabilistic k-double auctions that will be defined in Section 6.
More and more theoretical literature studies resale in standard auctions, such as sealed-bid
and English auctions.2 This paper is the first one that studies resale in rent-seeking contest en-
vironment.3 The main focus of this paper is to investigate how resale changes players’ strategic
behaviors in rent-seeking contests and its effect on expected revenue and allocative efficiency. We
2See Haile (2003) for a thorough analysis.
3Sui (2006) studies resale through a different setting: all-pay auctions. The resale results from new entrants to the
market, instead of possible inefficient allocation.
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hope that our study sheds some light on this interesting question.
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies
rent-seeking contests with private values and resale possibility and Section 4 contains parallel
study when values become public. Section 5 derives a general revenue ranking result. Section 6
examines two other resale mechanisms and Section 7 concludes. All proofs are contained in the
appendix.
2.2 THE MODEL
The rent-seeking contest proceeds as following. Two risk-neutral players, 1 and 2, compete for an
indivisible prize to be awarded by a seller. Each player privately learns her valuation of the prize,
v1 and v2. We assume that the possible realizations of valuation could be either low (vL) or high
(vH). The prior probability distribution of (v1,v2) is given by
f (v1,v2) =

1
2σ, if v1 = v2
1
2(1−σ), if v1 6= v2
(2.1)
The distribution is symmetric, but players’ values could be different and correlated. For instance,
σ = 0 refers to perfect negative correlation, σ = 1 to perfect positive correlation, and σ = 12 to
independence. From (1), we have the following conditional probabilities.
Pr(v2 = vL|v1 = vL) = Pr(v2 = vH |v1 = vH) = σ (2.2)
and
Pr(v2 = vL|v1 = vH) = Pr(v2 = vH |v1 = vL) = 1−σ (2.3)
After learning their private valuations, both players simultaneously submit nonnegative bids,
b1 and b2, which could also be considered as effort levels. Since both players are ex ante identical,
without loss of generality, we analyze the game from the standpoint of player 1. The probability
of player 1 wins the prize is given by p(b1,b2) defined as
p1(b1,b2) =
b1
b1+b2
(2.4)
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The winning probability of player 2 is 1− p1(b1,b2). For given values and bids, the expected
utility for player 1 is
U1(b1,b2) =
b1
b1+b2
v1−b1 (2.5)
Similarly, we could define U2(b1,b2). The utility functions and the probability distribution of
values are common knowledge.
After the prize is awarded, there is possibility of resale if the low-value player wins the prize.
With positive probability, the loser has high value. Thus there is potential gain resulting from
resale for the low-value winner. If the winner has high value, there is no resale since no potential
gain exists. For resale mechanism, we assume the winner possess full bargaining power, so he
will propose a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. The winner tries to extract as much surplus as
possible, so he will ask for vH and the high-value loser will accept the offer in equilibrium.
A pure strategy β1 for player 1 specifies a bid contingent on the realization of his private value.
Formally, β1 = (βL,βH) specifies bids βL if v1 = vL, βH if v1 = vH . A Bayesian equilibrium is
a pair of strategies (β1,β2) such that β1 maximizes player 1’s expected payoff conditional on his
realizations of value and player 2 using β2; and β2 maximizes player 2’s expected payoff condi-
tional on his realizations of value and player 1 using β1. The Bayesian equilibrium is symmetric if
β1 = β2 = β.
2.3 EQUILIBRIUMWITH PRIVATE VALUES AND RESALE
First we characterize a symmetric equilibrium and then provide the sufficient conditions under
which this equilibrium exists.
Suppose player 2 follow strategy β, player 1 learns his private value as vL and submits bL, then
his expected utility is
EU1(bL,β) = σ
bL
bL+βL
vL+(1−σ) bLbL+βH vH−bL (2.6)
With probability 1−σ, he competes with a high-value player and resells the prize at price equal
to player 2’s valuation vH ; with probability σ, the competitor has low value and there will be no
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resale. Maximizing (6) with respect to bL yields
σβL
(bL+βL)2
vL+
(1−σ)βH
(bL+βH)2
vH = 1 (2.7)
At the symmetric equilibrium, bL = βL, then
σ
4βL
vL+
(1−σ)βH
(βL+βH)2
vH = 1 (2.8)
Multiplying both sides of (8) by βL, we have
σ
4
vL+
(1−σ)βLβH
(βL+βH)2
vH = βL (2.9)
By symmetry, we also have
σ
4
vH +
(1−σ)βLβH
(βL+βH)2
vH = βH (2.10)
(9) and (10) imply that
βH−βL = σ4 (vH− vL) (2.11)
Since the objective functions are globally concave, solutions to (9) and (10) determine a unique
symmetric equilibrium. Due to analytical complexity, we cannot derive the closed-form equilib-
rium strategies. However, we do know that there exists one symmetric equilibrium determined by
(9) and (10).
Proposition 5. The symmetric equilibrium β of the rent-seeking contest with resale is given by the
solutions to (9) and (10). In addition, the equilibrium efforts satisfy βH−βLvH−vL =
σ
4 .
Malueg and Yates (2004) fully characterize equilibrium strategies for rent-seeking contests
with private values but without resale. Indeed, the equilibrium strategies have proportionality
property. For the convenience of comparative study, we summarize their result in the following
proposition as a reference.
Proposition 6. Let ρ = vLvH , then the symmetric equilibrium of the rent-seeking contest without
resale is given by β˜L = θ˜vL, β˜H = θ˜vH where θ˜= σ4 +
1−σ
(ρ−1/2+ρ1/2)2 .
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From (11), we have
βH−βL
vH− vL =
σ
4
(2.12)
By Proposition 2, we have
β˜H− β˜L
vH− vL =
σ
4
+
1−σ
(ρ−1/2+ρ1/2)2
≥ σ
4
=
βH−βL
vH− vL (2.13)
Remark 3. The introduction of resale possibility increases low-value player’s valuation upon
winning the contest since he has full bargaining power. Hence the low-value player has incentive to
bid more aggressively to increase the winning probability and his expected payoff upon winning.
As for the high-value player, the situation is as if she is now competing with a rival possessing
higher valuation than before. Standard wisdom in contest literature suggests that a player with
high valuation bids more aggressively if he learns his rival’s valuation is high rather than low.
However, the high-value player does not bid as more aggressively as the low-value player does.
This is the intuition behind (13).
The same intuition could explain the comparative statics of σ. Let δ = βH − βL, and δ˜ =
β˜H− β˜L, then we have
∂δ
∂σ
=
1
4
(vH− vL) (2.14)
and
∂δ˜
∂σ
= (
1
4
− 1
ρ+ρ−1+2
)(vH− vL)≤ 14(vH− vL) (2.15)
Increases in σ implies greater ex post similarity in realized values, thus evens out the contest.
But the effects of this evening out on equilibrium effort levels are different with or without resale.
Without resale, evening out the contest leads to closer competition; however, resale opportunities
lead to more aggressive competition for both players, thus distort the effect of evening out.
In rent-seeking contests, the overall welfare with resale possibilities is hard to tell. It is good
that resale promotes allocative efficiency ex post, however, more aggressive bids means more social
waste since more resources are devoted to unproductive activities. Our analysis may be justified if
revenue is one of goals when politicians allocate the rent.
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2.4 EQUILIBRIUMWITH PUBLIC VALUES AND RESALE
Consider the rent-seeking contests with public values and resale possibilities. We assume that
the realizations of (v1,v2) are revealed publicly to both players before they submit their bids.
We first characterize the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and then compare it with the symmetric
equilibrium we characterize in previous section.
According to the combination of values, we have four cases: (vL,vL), (vL,vH), (vH ,vL), and
(vH ,vH). For the first and last cases, there is no potential gain of resale, so resale indeed does
not take place for those two cases. Resale only happens when a low-value player competes with a
high-value rival.
Using similar arguments as in Section 3, we have the following result.
Proposition 7. The Nash equilibrium of rent-seeking contest with public values and resale possi-
bilities is given by β defined as
βLL =
vL
4
, βLH = βHL = βHH =
vH
4
Nti (1999) characterizes the equilibrium for contests with public values without considering
resale possibilities. We summarize his result in the following proposition:
Proposition 8. The unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the rent-seeking contest with public
values and without resale is given by (β˜1, β˜2) defined as
β˜i(vi,v j) =
v2i v j
(vi+ v j)2
(2.16)
From Proposition 4, we have β˜LL = vL4 , β˜HH =
vH
4 , β˜LH =
v2LvH
(vL+vH)2
, and β˜HL =
v2HvL
(vL+vH)2
.
Again resale opportunities make the low-value player compete more aggressively than other-
wise, in turn makes the high-value player compete more aggressively as well. This is clearly seen
from that
β˜LH ≤ β˜HL ≤ βLH = βHL (2.17)
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2.5 REVENUE ANDWELFARE
Now let us compare expected revenues resulting from rent-seeking contests with or without resale.
Let RC denote ex ante expected revenue resulting from contests with public values and resale,
then we have
RC = σ(βLL+βHH)+(1−σ)(βLH +βHL) = 14(σvL+(2−σ)vH) (2.18)
Let R˜C denote ex ante expected revenue resulting from contests with public values and no
resale, then we have
R˜C = σ(β˜LL+ β˜HH)+(1−σ)(β˜LH + β˜HL) = 14 [σ(vL+ vH)+4(1−σ)
vLvH
vL+ vH
] (2.19)
Therefore, we have
RC− R˜C = (1−σ)vH(vH− vL)2(vL+ vH) ≥ 0 (2.20)
Proposition 9. For rent-seeking contests with public values, the expected revenue with resale ex-
ceeds that without resale.
Malueg and Yates (2004) documents a revenue equivalent result for rent-seeking contest with-
out resale. They show that, ex ante expected revenue in rent-seeking contests with private in-
formation equals that in rent-seeking contests with public information. This could be verified as
following.
Let R˜I denote ex ante expected revenue resulting from contests with incomplete information
and no resale, and R˜C with complete information and no resale. Then we have
R˜I = σ(β˜L+ β˜H)+(1−σ)(β˜L+ β˜H) = θ˜(vL+ vH) (2.21)
and
R˜C = σ(β˜LL+ β˜HH)+(1−σ)(β˜LH + β˜HL) = θ˜(vL+ vH) (2.22)
As we know, the existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element for low-
value player’s valuation. Therefore, both players will compete more aggressively, which implies
that R˜I ≤ RI . But the extent for this upward change of valuation is different under different in-
formational regimes. With public information, the low-value player’s valuation upon winning
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is vH if competing with a high-value rival. With private information, however, it only becomes
σvL+(1−σ)vH since he does not know whether he competes with low-value or high-value rival.
It is this uncertainty that decreases low-value player’s incentive to bid more aggressively, hence
reduces seller’s expected revenue. Therefore, RI ≤ RC. This argument shows that the endoge-
nous element for low-value player’s valuation upon winning explains why rent-seeking contest
with public information is revenue superior. Without resale possibility, there is no such element.
Therefore, revenue equivalence follows.
Given the above results, we could derive a general revenue ranking for rent-seeking contests
with or without resale and with private values or public values. Therefore, the general revenue
ranking result follows.
Proposition 10. The ex ante expected revenues resulting from rent-seeking contests could be
ranked as
R˜C = R˜I ≤ RI ≤ RC (2.23)
As for the efficiency of allocation, with resale possibility the ex post allocation of the prize is
always efficient by construction of the equilibria. This is true regardless of informational regimes.
Proposition 11. For a two-player-two-value rent-seeking contest with resale possibilities, the ex
post allocation is always efficient regardless of informational regimes. Moreover, the ex post allo-
cation is inefficient with positive probability without resale. Hence, introducing resale possibility
enhances allocative efficiency ex post.
Without resale possibilities, Malueg and Yates (2004) shows that private-information and
public-information contests are identical in terms of allocative efficiency. Indeed, for each pos-
sible realization of players’ values (v1,v2), the prize is awarded to a player with the highest value
with the same probability in private-information contests as in public-information contests. How-
ever, in both informational regimes, ex post allocation is not efficient with positive probability.
This inefficiency will disappear if resale possibilities are introduced.
We must admit the limitation of Proposition 7. The ex post efficiency is only restored for the
simple case with two players and each player has two possible values. Once we deviate from this
simple model, Proposition 7 no longer holds. Consider the following example.
Example 2. Two players compete for one indivisible prize. Each player’s valuation is independent
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draw from {vL,vM,vH} with equal probability, where vL ≤ vM ≤ vH .
If the realized values are the same, the ex post allocation is efficient no matter who wins the
prize. If the realized values are different, there is no scheme ensuring ex post efficiency. If the
winner has high value, there will no resale. If the winner has medium value, he will ask vH , and
the offer will be accepted in equilibrium if his rival has high value. If the winner has low value,
there is no optimal bargaining scheme that ensures efficiency ex post. If the low-value asks vM,
his expected valuation will be vL+2vM3 ; if the low-value asks vH , his expected valuation will be
2vL+vH
3 . Depending on different parameter values, the low-value winner’s optimal asking price
may be different. For instance, if vM < vL+vH2 , he will ask vH . However, with positive probability
his rival may have medium valuation. Hence, the final allocation may not be efficient with positive
probability.
Intuitively, the more values both players have, the more difficult to ensure ex post efficiency
through resale. If both players have continuous private valuation, Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) show that there is no incentive-compatible individually rational bargaining mechanism can
be ex post efficient.
2.6 OTHER RESALE MECHANISMS
Until now we just consider only one possibility of resale mechanism: the winner makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. We refer to this as monopoly resale since the winner has full
bargaining power. In practice the resale buyer may share the bargaining power with the seller or
even have full bargaining power. In this Section, we consider other possible resale mechanisms:
monopsony pricing and probabilistic k-double auctions. Specifically, monopsony pricing means
that the buyer has full bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. For
probabilistic k-double auctions, we refer to the case in which with probability k, the seller makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer and with probability 1−k, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the seller.4
4As Hafalir and Krishna (2006) points out, the term k-double auction usually refers to a situation in which the price
is weighted average of the price demanded by the seller and that offered by the buyer.
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2.6.1 MONOPSONY RESALE
For monopsony resale, the loser of contest has full bargaining power and can make a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to and buy the prize from the winner. As before, resale only takes place when the
realized valuations of both players are different. Then the high-value loser exerts his bargaining
power by offering a price equals to the low-value winner’s valuation, vL, and extracts all the surplus.
Suppose player 2 follow strategy µ, player 1 learns his private value as vL and submits bL, the
expected payoff for him is
EU1(bL,µ) = [σ
bL
bL+µL
+(1−σ) bL
bL+µH
]vL−bL (2.24)
Similarly, the expected payoff for player 1 if his private value is vH and he bids bH :
EU1(bH ,µ) = σ
bH
bH +µH
vH +(1−σ)[ bHbH +µL vH +
µL
bH +µH
(vH− vL)]−bH (2.25)
By manipulating the first-order conditions, we have
µH−µL = σ4 (vH− vL) (2.26)
The above result is quite interesting since we have exactly the same relationship for monopoly
resale mechanism. In other words, no matter who has the full bargaining power, the ratio between
difference in equilibrium efforts and difference in valuation remains the same: σ4 .
Similarly, as before we can derive the equilibrium strategies with public values and monopsony
resale:
µLL = µLH = µHL =
vL
4
, µHH =
vH
4
(2.27)
Hence the ex ante expected revenue is
RˆC =
1
4
(σvH +(2−σ)vL) (2.28)
Recall that R˜C = 14 [σ(vL+ vH)+4(1−σ) vLvHvL+vH ], then we have
RˆC− R˜C = 2(1−σ)vL(vL− vH)vL+ vH ≤ 0 (2.29)
Proposition 12. For rent-seeking contests with public values, if the losing player possesses full
bargaining power, resale opportunities decrease expected revenue for the seller.
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Remark 4. The intuition underlying Proposition 8 is as follows. Assigning full bargaining power
to the loser only benefits the high-value player. This makes high-value player’s expected payoff
upon losing the contest positive. This decreases his incentive to compete as aggressively as what
he does without resale opportunities. Moreover, the low-value player has incentive to bid less
aggressively since he has no bargaining power upon winning, no additional benefit upon losing.
Therefore, the overall equilibrium outlay is less than that without resale.
2.6.2 PROBABILISTIC K-DOUBLE AUCTIONS
In this mechanism, resale takes place as follows. With probability k, the winner of contest makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser and with probability 1− k the loser makes a take-it-or-leave-
it offer to the winner. Again resale takes place ex post only if players have different valuations.
Obviously if k = 1, this reduces to the monopoly resale mechanism considered earlier. If k = 0, it
reduces to the monopsony resale mechanism. In this subsection, we consider the case 0< k < 1.
Let us first characterize the symmetric equilibrium strategies. Suppose player 2 follow τ, player
1 learns his valuation as vL and submits bL, his expected payoff will be
EU1(bL,τ) = σ
bL
bL+ τL
vL+(1−σ) bLbL+ τH v˜−bL (2.30)
where v˜= kvH +(1− k)vL is the expected valuation upon winning when player 1 competes with a
high-value rival.
Similarly, the expected payoff for player 1 if his private value is vH and he bids bH :
EU1(bH ,τ) = σ
bH
bH + τH
vH +(1−σ)[ bHbH + τL vH +
τL
bH + τL
vˇ]−bH (2.31)
where vˇ = (1− k)(vH − vL) is the expected valuation upon losing when player 1 competes with a
low-value rival.
By manipulating the first-order conditions, we have
τH− τL = σ4 (vH− vL) (2.32)
From previous analysis, we already know that such relationship holds in cases k = 1 and k =
0. It is not surprising to observe the same relationship when 0 < k < 1. Let us summarize this
interesting finding as follows.
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Proposition 13. For rent-seeking contests with resale, the ratio between difference in equilibrium
effort and difference in valuation remains a constant (σ4 ) independent of the distribution of bar-
gaining power. Furthermore, this ratio is less than that without resale (σ4 +
1−σ
ρ+ρ−1+2).
To figure out the expected revenue if values are public information, we need to derive the
equilibrium strategies first. It is trivial to show that
τLL =
vL
4
, τHH =
vH
4
, τLH = τHL =
(kvH +(1− k)vL)
4
(2.33)
Therefore, the ex ante expected revenue with public information (R¯C) is
R¯C =
1
4
(mvH +(2−m)vL) (2.34)
where m= σ+2(1−σ)k.
Recall the expected revenue with public values and without resale R˜C = 14 [σ(vL+ vH)+4(1−
σ) vLvHvL+vH ], then we have
R¯C− R˜C = 2(1−σ)(vH− vL)[k(vL+ vH)− vL]vL+ vH (2.35)
Hence, R¯C ≥ R˜C if and only if k ≥ vLvL+vH .
It is interesting to examine how the ex ante expected revenue will change if the distribution of
bargaining power varies. Given R¯C = 14(mvH +(2−m)vL), we have
∂R¯C
∂k
=
1−σ
2
(vH− vL)≥ 0 (2.36)
The intuition is quite straightforward. The resale possibility introduces an endogenous element
to the winner’s valuation upon winning. The more bargaining power the winner has, the more
surplus he can extract from resale.5 Hence, the low-value player will bid more aggressively. This
means the high-value player is competing against a rival with higher valuation, thus he will also bid
more aggressively. The unconditional payment rule of rent-seeking contests renders the expected
revenue to become larger as more bargaining power goes to the winner. Indeed, we have6
RˆC ≤ R¯C ≤ RC (2.37)
5When vL = vH or σ= 1, the expected revenue is independent of the distribution of bargaining power. Under these
two extremes, both players’ valuations are perfectly aligned, hence there will be no resale.
6It is trivial to show that RC ≥ RˆC. Note R¯C− RˆC = r4 (vH−vL)(m−σ)≥ 0 since m= 2k−2kσ+σ≥ σ. Moreover,
RC− R¯C = r4 (vH − vL)(2−m−σ)≥ 0 since 2−m−σ= 2(1−σ)(1− k)≥ 0.
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It is trivial to show that βLL = µLL = τLL, βHH = µHH = τHH , βLH ≥ τLH ≥ µLH , and βHL ≥
τHL ≥ µHL.7 Again the intuition is as before. Although the high-value player loses more bar-
gaining power as k increases, he still bids more aggressively since the low-value player bids more
aggressively as k increases. It is as if the high-value player is competing against with a rival with
higher and higher valuation. Simple manipulation of equilibria strategies shows that the ex ante
expected bids are getting bigger as the winner gets more bargaining power. This is true for both
the low-value player and the high-value player.
A general revenue ranking among all possible situations is not available. It can be shown that
the general ranking will depend on specific realization of parameter values.
2.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have introduced into a standard rent-seeking contest with private values the interesting feature
that resale may take place whenever there is a potential gain from implementing it. We character-
ize the symmetric equilibrium and find an interesting proportional difference property. We show
that resale enhances both ex post allocative efficiency and seller’s ex ante expected revenue. By
comparing both private and public information regimes, we derive a general revenue ranking for
rent-seeking contest. It turns out that the highest expected revenue goes to the case with resale and
public information. Depending on different parameter values, ex ante a player may prefer values
to be private, public or indifferent. Similarly, whether resale possibility benefits a player ex ante
depends on different parameter values.
For analytic simplicity, we focus on a two-player-two-value model and assume that the winner
has full bargaining power in resale. The two-player-two-value setting ensures that most of our
results are robust to variation of resale mechanisms. Indeed, they survive for any resale mechanism
in which the resale price is somewhere between both players’ valuations. But they do not survive if
each player has more than two values. For example, if each player has three values, resale cannot
lead to efficient allocation ex post. Depending on different configurations of values, the allocation
7The ex ante bids submitted by the low-value player are vL4 , σ
vL
4 +(1−σ) (kvH+(1−k)vL)4 and σ vL4 +(1−σ) vH4 for
k= 0, 0< k< 1, k= 1 respectively. Similarly, the ex ante bids submitted by the high-value player are σ vH4 +(1−σ) vL4 ,
σ vH4 +(1−σ) (kvH+(1−k)vL)4 , and vH4 for k = 0, 0< k < 1, k = 1 respectively.
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may not be always efficient ex post. Suppose that possible values are low, intermediate or high,
the low-value player wins the contest and has full bargaining power. After updating his posterior
belief, the low-value winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in order to maximize his expected
payoff. If values are private information, there is no general optimal pricing scheme that ensures
efficiency ex post.8
More general analysis needs to be addressed with more than two players and continuous type
space. Unfortunately there is no theoretical benchmark for rent-seeking contests with private in-
formation and more than two players or continuous type space. Actually it remains open to char-
acterize equilibrium strategies for just two players whose valuations’ supports have three points.
The characterization of equilibrium strategies for these situations with or without resale seems a
challenging exercise.
8I am indebted to Andreas Blume for pointing out to me this arguments, which lead to an interesting generalization
for the current model.
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3.0 THE IMPERFECTLY DISCRIMINATING CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the existence of pure-strategy equilibria for imperfectly discriminating contests
with incomplete information. Many economic allocations are decided by competition over a prize
where each participant exerts effort or spends resource to win the prize, and the losers’ efforts or
expenditures are irreversible. Rent seeking activities such as lobbying, R&D contests, arm races,
political campaigns, and sports contests are a few examples.
Since Tullock’s (1975, 1980) seminal contribution, two models are widely used in this litera-
ture to study players’ behavior under these situations: perfectly discriminating model–all-pay auc-
tions, and imperfectly discriminating model–lotteries. In the former situation, the player making
the highest effort or spend the most resource is designated the winner, while in the latter situation,
the allocation of the prize is stochastic in the following sense: the probability that a given player
wins the prize is proportional to her expenditure relative to the total expenditure. Even if one player
spends the most, she can never guarantee winning the prize as long as there is any positive expen-
diture made by the others. The exogenous choice of deterministic or stochastic success function is
the essential difference between these two models.
For all-pay auctions with complete information, the equilibria are fully characterized by Baye
et al. (1996) for arbitrary configurations of valuations. For incomplete information all-pay auc-
tions, equilibrium behaviors have been studied by Hillman and Riley (1989), and Krishna and
Morgan (1997). Equilibrium uniqueness in frameworks with two players is addressed in Amann
and Leininger (1996) and Lizzeri and Persico (2000). For independent private values and risk
averse bidders, or positive interdependent values and independent information, the existence of a
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non-decreasing pure strategy equilibrium is documented in Athey (2001).
For lotteries, equilibria with complete information are fully characterized by Hillman and Riley
(1989). Fang (2002) further shows that the equilibrium characterized by Hillman and Riley (1989)
is unique. Using a two-player-two-value model, Malueg and Yates (2004) first studies lotteries
with private values.1 However, a general theoretical benchmark for imperfectly discriminating
contests remains open.
The imperfectly discriminating contests addressed in this paper could be embedded into a large
class of Bayesian games whose existence of equilibria is thoroughly studied. For a large class of
games of incomplete information, Athey (2001) shows the existence of pure strategy equilibria
under the so-called single crossing condition.2 Mcadams (2003) extends Athey’s results to settings
in which type and action spaces are multi-dimensional and partially ordered.3 Most recently, Reny
(2006) provides a generalization of the results of both Athey and Mcadams through a new route.4
Following their methods, we provide the sufficient conditions under which a monotonic pure
strategy equilibrium exists in the imperfectly discriminating contests. We use Athey’s method to
show the existence for finite-action contest games, and use Reny’s method for continuum-action
contest games. Although Reny’s method could work for both cases, Athey’s method is more
helpful for computational analysis of the equilibrium strategies. Actually Athey first discretizes
the action space to show the existence results for finite-action games, and then invokes limiting
arguments to show the existence results for continuum-action games. This naturally provides an
algorithm for computational study.
Using a two-player-two-value example, we characterize the symmetric equilibrium and show
the monotonicity of equilibrium strategies. The ex post allocation may be inefficient since the
low-value player wins the prize with positive probability in equilibrium.5 If each player has three
values about the prize, it is too complex to derive the closed-form equilibrium strategies though
1They actually adopt a more general model than a pure lottery since a discriminating factor r is included.
2Athey’s result is now a central tool for establishing the existence of pure strategy equilibria in auction theory. See
Reny and Zamir (2004).
3This permits new existence results in auctions with multi-dimensional signals and multi-unit demands. See
Mcadams (2004).
4Reny achieves this goal by relying on a more powerful fixed point theorem than those used by Athey and
Mcadams.
5Sui (2006) introduce resale possibility to this example and show that the allocation is always efficient ex post and
the contest designer could benefit by allowing resale.
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there does exist a non-decreasing equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as following. Section 3.2 provides a simple two-player
example satisfying the hypotheses of our main result. The essential ideas behind the present tech-
nique are also provided there. Section 3.3 contains existence results for finite-action contests and
another example with finite actions. Existence of equilibria for continuum-action contests is pre-
sented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 AN EXAMPLE
We begin with a simple example to present the main approach in order to show the existence of
monotone pure strategy equilibria.
Consider a contest between two bidders competing for a single prize. Each bidder’s valuation
is private information, which is independent random draw from [v, v¯] according to the identical
distribution F . After observing her private valuation, bidder i will decide how much to bid. The
allocation of the prize will depend on both bids as follows:
pi =
bi
bi+b j
(3.1)
where pi is the winning probability of bidder i, and bi is the bid submitted by bidder i. The above
success function is the main characteristic of imperfectly discriminating contest. It is a special case
of Tullock’s original model about rent-seeking.6 As long as the other bidder submits a positive bid,
one bidder can never win the prize with probability one, contrasting to the all-pay auctions in which
the highest bid wins the object with probability one if there is no tie. In this sense, our model is
like a “lottery”, the more tickets you buy, the higher probability you could win the prize. However,
as long as any other people buy any tickets, you can never guarantee winning the prize.7
A pure strategy for bidder i is a function βi : [v, v¯]→ Bi ⊂ R+. Since both bidders are ex ante
identical, it is natural to assume that they use symmetric bidding strategies in this example.
6In Tullock’s original model, the probability of winning for every bidder i is b
r
i
bri+b
r
j
, where r is the discriminating
factor. If r equals to 1, it is just our lottery model. If r goes to infinity, that will be all-pay auction model.
7We implicitly assume that any single bidder cannot buy all the tickets, due to her budget constraint or some other
reasons.
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Suppose bidder 2 follow the strategy β, bidder 1 learns her private valuation v1 and submits b,
the expected utility for bidder 1 is:
pi1 =
Z v¯
v
b
b+β(v)
dF(v)v1−b (3.2)
then the maximizing problem facing bidder 1 is:
max
b≥0
pi1 =
Z v¯
v
b
b+β(v)
dF(v)v1−b
The first order condition is given by:Z v¯
v
β(v)
[b+β(v)]2
dF(v)v1−1= 0 (3.3)
and equilibrium requires that b= β(v1). Substituting the latter equality into the first order condition
yields: Z v¯
v
β(v)
[β(v1)+β(v)]2
dF(v)v1−1= 0 (3.4)
Suppose the bidding strategy for bidder 2 is strictly increasing, that is, β′(v)> 0, we could use
the first order condition to characterize that the best response of bidder 1 is also strictly increasing.
A simple transformation gives us:Z v¯
v
β(v)
[β(v1)+β(v)]2
dF(v) =
1
v1
(3.5)
Take derivative with respect to v1 on both sides of equation (5), by simple transformation we have:
Z v¯
v
β(v)β′(v1)
[β(v1)+β(v)]3
dF(v) =
1
2v21
(3.6)
So long as β is strictly positive, we can conclude that the best response for bidder 1 is also using a
strictly increasing bidding strategy, given the other bidder uses a strictly increasing bidding strat-
egy. By symmetry, we know that if bidder 1 adopts a strictly increasing strategy, the best response
strategy for bidder 2 will also be strictly increasing. Hence, our example satisfies the Spence-
Mirlees single-crossing condition and we could use similar approach as Athey (2001) to show the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium, although we cannot get the closed form of equilibrium
bidding strategies directly from the first order condition.
Let Ui(bi,vi,β j) denote the interim utility function for bidder i, given the bidding strategy of
bidder j, β j, we have:
Ui(bi,vi,β j) =
Z v¯
v
bi
bi+β j(v)
dF(v)vi−bi (3.7)
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Definition 1. The function U satisfies the (Milgrom-Shannon)single crossing property of incre-
mental returns (SCP-IR) in (b,v) if, for all b′ > b and all v′ > v, U(b′,v)−U(b,v) ≥ 0 implies
U(b′,v′)−U(b,v′)≥ 0.
Definition 2. The single crossing condition for games of incomplete information (SCC) is satisfied
if for each i= 1,2, whenever every opponent j 6= i uses a strategy β j that is nondecreasing, bidder
i’s objective function Ui(bi,vi,β j) satisfies single crossing of incremental returns in (bi,vi).
We have the following sufficient condition for SCP-IR:
∂2
∂b∂v
U(b,v)≥ 0
Then, consider the interim utility function given in equation (7), we have:
∂2
∂bi∂vi
Ui(bi,vi,β j) =
Z v¯
v
β j(v)
[bi+β j(v)]2
dF(v)≥ 0 (3.8)
Moreover,Ui is continuous in both bidders’ bids if they both submit positive bids.8 Therefore,
we could apply one of Athey (2001)’s corollary to show the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (PSNE) in nondecreasing strategies.
Before we state that corollary, we need the following assumption. Let f (·) be the join density
over bidders’ type, with the conditional density of v−i given vi denoted f (v−i|vi).9 Then, we have:
Assumption 3. The valuations have bounded and atomless join density with respect to Lebesgue
measure, f (·). Further, Rvi∈S ui(bi,β−i(v−i),v) f (v−i|vi)dv−i exists and is finite for all convex S
and all nondecreasing functions β j :Vj → B j, j 6= i.
Theorem 4 (Athey). Given Assumption 1 and the SCC, if each i has identical action space Bi,
ui(b,v) is continuous in b, then there exists a PSNE in nondecreasing strategies.
Remark 5. The key point to apply Athey’s existence result is the SCC, which ensures the existence
of monotone best replies for one bidder whenever the other bidder chooses monotone bidding
strategies. Moreover, the special feature of this simple game–stochastic success function, simplifies
the exposition by avoiding the discontinuity problem commonly observed in auction models.
8Fortunately, this is due to the stochastic success function in our contest model. On the contrary, if we use the
all-pay auction model, there is discontinuity of the utility function upon winning or losing the auction.
9Although we focus on independent types in this example, for more general analysis in next section, we state the
assumption in a general setting.
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We already show that the SCC is satisfied in our simple example. Since bidders’s private valua-
tions are independently and identically distributed, and each bidder’s utility function is continuous
in valuations and bids, the Assumption 1 is satisfied as long as the distribution F admits a bounded
and atomless density. Both bidders are ex ante identical, it is natural to assume that they have
identical action space, that is, the support of their bidding strategies are the same. Therefore, our
simple example satisfies all the conditions and assumptions of Athey’s Corollary, and hence there
exists one PSNE in nondecreasing strategies in our example.
3.3 FINITE-ACTION BAYESIAN CONTEST
3.3.1 EXISTENCE OF A PSNE
Now consider a general Bayesian contest between N bidders competing over one single prize,
where each bidder i observes her private valuation vi ∈ V ≡ [v, v¯] ⊂ R and then submits a bid
bi from a compact subset Bi ⊂ R+. Let B = B1× ·· · × BN ,V = VN = [v, v¯]N ,bi ≡ minBi, and
b¯i ≡ maxBi. The joint density over bidders’ valuations is f (·), with the conditional density of v−i
given vi denoted f (v−i|vi). Bidder i’s utility function is ui : B×V→R. Given any set of strategies
for the opponents, β j :Vj → B j, j 6= i, bidder i’s interim utility is given as follows:
Ui(bi,vi;β−i(·))≡
Z
v−i
ui(bi,β−i(v−i),v) f (v−i|vi)dv−i. (3.9)
As Athey (2001), we maintain Assumption 1 and the SCC through this section.10 One im-
portant insight of Athey (2001) is that “when the action set is finite, any nondecreasing strategy
is a step function, and the strategy can be described simply by naming the values of the player’s
type ti at which the player ‘jumps’ from one action to the next higher action”.11 For instance, let
Bi = {b0,b1, ...,bM} be the set of potential bids, in ascending order, where M+1 is the number of
potential bids. Define VMi ≡ [v, v¯]M,
Σi ≡ {x ∈VM+2i |x0 = v,x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ·· · ≤ xM,xM+1 = v¯} (3.10)
10As in our example, the SCC implies that in response to nondecreasing strategies by all opponents, each bid-
der’s best response is nondecreasing in the strong set order. Thus, each bidder has a best response strategy that is
nondecreasing.
11This is the so-called Athey Map. For more details, refer to Athey (2001).
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and let Σ ≡ Σ1×·· ·×ΣN . A nondecreasing strategy for bidder i, βi : Vi → Bi, can be represented
by a vector x ∈ Σi according to Athey (2001).
Similar to U1(b1,v1;X), we use V1(b1,v1;X) to denote the expected utility for bidder 1 with
valuation v1 when bidder 1 chooses b1 ∈ B1 and bidder 2, ...N use strategies consistent with
(x2, ...,xN). Since we assume that opponent strategies are nondecreasing, the SCC implies that
V1(b1,v1;X) satisfies the SCP-IR in (bi,vi) for all X ∈ Σ.
The existence proof used by Athey proceeds by showing that a fixed point exists for the best
response correspondence which is defined as follows. Let Γ = (Γ1, ...,ΓN), where Γi ≡ {y ∈ Σi :
∃βi(·) that is consistent with y such that ∀vi ∈ V,βi(vi) ∈ bBRi (vi|X). A critical property required
for this purpose is convexity. Let bBRi (vi|X)≡ argmaxbi∈BiV1(b1,v1;X), which is nonempty by the
finiteness. She shows that the best response correspondence is convex if bBRi (vi|X) is nondecreasing
in the strong set order, which results from the SCC condition. With convexity established, the
existence result is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 5 (Athey). Suppose Assumption 1 and the SCC hold. If Bi is finite for all i, this game
has a PSNE where each bidder’s equilibrium strategy, βi(·), is nondecreasing.
Proof. See Athey (2001).
Remark 6. The central theme for this result is the assumption of finiteness. It guarantees that an
optimal action exists for every type and also simplifies the description of strategies so that they can
be represented with finite-dimensional vectors. This in turn simplifies the exposition of convexity of
the best response correspondence so that we could apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to show
the existence of a PSNE.
For finite-action Bayesian games, the existence of PSNE is also reported in Milgrom and We-
ber (1985). More precisely they first show the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in a game
where players choose probability distributions over the actions, and then provide purification the-
orems.12However, their approach is limited by requiring that players’ types are independently dis-
tributed and their utility only depend on their own types, the other players’ actions, and the common
state variables. Moreover, they also assume “absolute continuity” of probability measure. Under
12They use the war of attrition as one revealing example, which is another model dealing with contest instances.
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all these conditions, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.13
To the best of our knowledge, there is no general theoretical benchmark dealing with imper-
fectly discriminating contests with incomplete information. Obviously, it is analytically difficult to
derive the closed-form equilibrium bidding strategies. However, given the existence result, we can
use computational methods to numerically describe the optimal bidding strategies if all bidders use
nondecreasing strategies. The computation of a finite-action equilibrium requires searching a fixed
point to the correspondence Γ defined above, where the calculation of Γ(X) is a simple exercise of
calculating the best-response jump points for each bidder i. But it is not easy to solve the nonlinear
set of equations X= Γ(X).14
3.3.2 AN EXAMPLEWITH FINITE ACTIONS: TWO BIDDERS
3.3.2.1 TWO VALUES Now we use a simple example with finite actions to see some prop-
erties of the equilibrium strategies. Consider a contest with two bidders. Each bidder’s valuation
could be either high (vH) or low (vL) with equal probability 12 . Each bidder knows her valua-
tion privately, and the distribution of valuation is common knowledge. We look for a symmetric
bidding equilibrium since both bidders are ex ante identical. We solve the game from bidder 1’s
perspective.
Suppose bidder 2 follow the strategy β, and bidder 1 learns her valuation to be vL and submits
a positive bid b, her expected payoff is:
pi= [
1
2
b
b+β(vL)
+
1
2
b
b+β(vH)
]vL−b (3.11)
The first order condition is:
β(vL)
(b+β(vL))2
+
β(vH)
(b+β(vH))2
=
2
vL
(3.12)
The symmetric equilibrium requires that b= β(vL). Substituting this into equation (12) yields:
1
4β(vL)
+
β(vH)
(β(vL)+β(vH))2
=
2
vL
(3.13)
13If we relax the independence assumption, this approach may fail to work. See Radner and Rosenthal (1982).
14Athey (1997) provides a number of computational examples that could be computed using either variations on the
algorithm Xk+1 = λ ·Γ(Xk)+(1−λ) ·Xk, or quasi-Newton approaches.
42
By symmetry, we get the following equation:
1
4β(vH)
+
β(vL)
(β(vL)+β(vH))2
=
2
vH
(3.14)
Solving equations (13)(14) simultaneously, we have the following candidates of equilibrium strate-
gies:
β(v) =

vL[(vL+vH)2+4vLvH ]
8(vL+vH)2
, if v= vL
vH [(vL+vH)2+4vLvH ]
8(vL+vH)2
, if v= vH
(3.15)
The payoff function is globally concave, hence the first order condition is also sufficient for
the optimality. The above bidding strategy is indeed a symmetric equilibrium. Obviously we have
β(vL) < β(vH), which means that the symmetric equilibrium is strictly increasing. It is easy to
check that β(v) < v4 , as long as vL < vH . Under complete information with identical valuation v,
the optimal bid is v4 . With uncertainty about other bidder’s valuation, each bidder continues to
shade her bid in order to secure more rents upon winning the contest, regardless of realization of
her valuation. The expected bid for each bidder would be
1
2
β(vL)+
1
2
β(vH) =
(vL+ vH)2+4vLvH
16(vL+ vH)
<
vL+ vH
8
(3.16)
which means that the expected bid for each bidder is less than one quarter of their expected valua-
tion.
Under complete information with two bidders, Nti (1999) characterizes the equilibrium strate-
gies:
βi(vi,v j) =

vi
4 , if vi = v j
v2i v j
(vi+v j)2
, if vi 6= v j
(3.17)
Obviously if the valuations are asymmetric, both bidders bid less than one quarter of their valu-
ations. With symmetric valuations, they bid exactly one quarter of their valuations. Therefore,
the asymmetry between these two bidders has similar effect as uncertainty. When the weak bid-
der (low-value) competes with the strong bidder (high-value), she would shade her bid further so
that the optimal bid is below one quarter of her valuation. Given this strategy of weak bidder, the
optimal bid for the strong bidder will also be below one quarter of her valuation.
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The intuition underlying is quite straightforward. Facing competition of a strong bidder, the
weak bidder has relative lower probability of winning the contest, hence is reluctant to bid up to
one quarter of her valuation.15 This further-shading strategy is optimal for the weak bidder even
she does know that there is still positive probability for her to win the contest. In equilibrium,
the strong bidder correctly predicts the weak bidder’s strategy, so she does not need bid up to one
quarter of her valuation to secure the rent. Therefore, the strong bidder also shades her bid in
equilibrium.
Further investigation shows that the expected revenue for the contest designer is the same for
both complete information case and incomplete information case. Roughly speaking, ex ante the
designer cannot manipulate the information release to enhance her expected revenue. Formally,
the expected payment with incomplete information is 2(12β(vL)+
1
2β(vH)) =
(vL+vH)2+4vLvH
8(vL+vH)
. The
expected payment with complete information is 14(
vL
2 +
vH
2 +2
vLvH
vL+vH
) = (vL+vH)
2+4vLvH
8(vL+vH)
.16 This also
means that ex ante it makes no difference for the designer if she does not know the exact realization
of both valuations.17
Since ex ante the expected revenue is the same for the contest designer between complete
information case and incomplete information case, the equilibrium payoffs to a typical bidder are
also the same ex ante. This is quite straightforward since the total social surplus is fixed. Simple
calculation yields that piI = piC =
5v2L+5v
2
H−2vLvH
16(vL+vH)
. 18
3.3.3 THREE VALUES
Now we consider the same two-bidder example except that each bidder has three values with equal
probability: vL, vM and vH . Again we solve the game from bidder 1’s perspective.
Suppose bidder 2 follow the strategy β˜, and bidder 1 learns her valuation to be vL and submits
15She would like to bid one quarter of her valuation only if she is sure that she competes with a bidder having same
valuation.
16For complete information, the expected payment is 14 (
1
2 +2
2
3 +1) =
17
24 . For incomplete information, the expected
payment is 14 (
34
72 +2
51
72 +
68
72 ) =
17
24 .
17Using a more general two-bidder, two-valuation model, Malueg and Yates (2004) derive the same revenue equiv-
alent result for rent seeking with private values. They do not extend the results to more general cases with N > 2
bidders.
18Numerically, piI = piC = 716 .
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a positive bid b, her expected payoff is:
pi= [
1
3
b
b+ β˜(vL)
+
1
3
b
b+ β˜(vM)
+
1
3
b
b+ β˜(vH)
]vL−b (3.18)
The first order condition is:
β˜(vL)
(b+ β˜(vL))2
+
β˜(vM)
(b+ β˜(vM))2
+
β˜(vH)
(b+ β˜(vH))2
=
3
vL
(3.19)
The symmetric equilibrium requires that b= β˜(vL). Substituting this into equation (19) yields:
1
4β˜(vL)
+
β˜(vM)
(β˜(vL)+ β˜(vM))2
+
β˜(vH)
(β˜(vL)+ β˜(vH))2
=
3
vL
(3.20)
Multiplying both sides of (20) by β˜(vL) yields:
1
4
+
β˜(vL)β˜(vM)
(β˜(vL)+ β˜(vM))2
+
β˜(vL)β˜(vH)
(β˜(vL)+ β˜(vH))2
=
3β˜(vL)
vL
(3.21)
By symmetry, we get the following equation:
1
4
+
β˜(vL)β˜(vM)
(β˜(vL)+ β˜(vM))2
+
β˜(vM)β˜(vH)
(β˜(vM)+ β˜(vH))2
=
3β˜(vM)
vM
(3.22)
and
1
4
+
β˜(vL)β˜(vH)
(β˜(vL)+ β˜(vH))2
+
β˜(vM)β˜(vH)
(β˜(vM)+ β˜(vH))2
=
3β˜(vH)
vH
(3.23)
Equations (21)-(23) determine a symmetric equilibrium, but it is analytically complex to derive
the closed-form equilibrium strategies. Full characterization of equilibrium strategies for two-
bidder-three-value contests with incomplete information remains an open question, so does the
two-bidder case with continuous private values.19
19Wa¨rneryd (2003) studies two-bidder contests for a prize of common by uncertain value. He shows that equilibrium
expenditure are lower under asymmetric information than if either both bidders are informed or neither is informed.
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3.4 CONTINUUM-ACTION BAYESIAN CONTEST
3.4.1 LIMITING APPROACH
For Bayesian contests with a continuum of actions, we could use similar limiting argument as
Athey (2001) to show the existence of equilibria in nondecreasing strategies. We continue to
assume the SCC, which guarantees that for any finite subset of action space, there exists one
PSNE in nondecreasing strategies. Then we could use limiting argument to show the existence
of a PSNE for continuum-action contests since sequences of uniformly bounded, nondecreasing
functions have convergent subsequences. As we show above, one special feature of our Bayesian
contest games is that the imperfectly discriminating contest could avoid the discontinuity problem
by assuming that the lowest possible bid bi is positive for every bidder i. Given this assumption,
the utility function for each bidder is continuous in all bids. Formally, ui(b,v) is continuous in
b. In the following, we use this continuity to show that the limit of a sequence of equilibria in
finite-action games is an equilibrium of the continuum-action game. Moreover, in our setting, all
bidders are ex ante identical hence it is trivial that, for all i, Bi = [bi, b¯i]. Combining all this, we
have the following result.
Theorem 6. Given Assumption 1, if for all i, Bi = [bi, b¯i], a PSNE exists in nondecreasing strategies
in the contest game where bidders choose bids from B.
Proof. See Athey (2001).
Remark 7. Theorem 1 could be considered as one Corollary of Theorem 3. If we impose the SCC
assumption, there exists a PSNE in nondecreasing strategies for every finite-action game. Then,
our contest games satisfy all the conditions to apply Athey’s theorem, the result follows naturally.
Besides providing existence results, Athey (2001) also characterizes sufficient conditions un-
der which the SCC holds. She shows that the SCC holds if ui(b,v) is supermodular in b and
(bi,v j), j = 1, ...,N and types are affiliated. 20 It is not easy to show similar characterization in our
Bayesian contest games. Indeed, we cannot ensure that the utility functions in our contest games
20If X is a lattice, the function h : X →R is supermodular if, for all x,y ∈ X ,h(x∨y)+h(x∧y)≥ h(x)+h(y). The
operations ”meet” (∨) and ”join” (∧) are defined for product sets as follows: x∨y= (max(x1,y1), ...,max(xn,yn)) and
x∧y= (min(x1,y1), ...,min(xn,yn)).
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are supermodular in general. However, she characterizes the sufficient condition for supermodu-
larity for all-pay auction, which is quite similar to our contest games. Let Ui(vi− bi) denote the
utility for bidder i to get the prize, Ui(−bi) denote the utility for bidder i to lose the prize, then
the expected payoffs are given by (Ui(vi− bi)−Ui(−bi))Pr(bi wins)+Ui(−bi). No matter what
opponents do, this expression is supermodular so long as Ui is increasing and concave, then the
SCC holds.21
While we are working through the existence results, Reny (2006) shows the existence of mono-
tone pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games using a different approach from that of Athey
(2001). The following subsection summarizes the application of Reny’s approach to our contest
games.
3.4.2 LATTICE APPROACH
Based on a more powerful fixed-point theorem, Reny (2006) works on the contractibility of bid-
ders’ set of best response, instead of working on the property of convexity, which is crucial to
apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Although it is not trivial to show the contractibility for a
general set, Reny argues that establishing the contractibility of each bidder’s set of monotone best
replies, for any given monotone bidding functions of the others, is rather simple. Without referring
to the Athey map and without considering jump points, we consider directly the monotone bidding
functions themselves.
Roughly speaking, a set is contractible if it can be continuously shrunk, within itself, to one of
its points. Formally, a subset X of a topological space is contractible if for some x0 ∈ X there is a
continuous function h : [0,1]×X → X such that for all x ∈ X ,h(0,x) = x and h(1,x) = x0. We then
say that h is a contraction for X . Actually contractibility is a strictly more permissive condition
than convexity.22
It can be shown that, so long as each bidder possesses a monotone best reply whenever the
21Let pi denote the objective function: (Ui(vi − bi)−Ui(−bi))Pr(biwins) +Ui(−bi). Then we have ∂2pi∂bi∂vi =
∂2Ui(vi−bi)
∂bi∂vi
Pr(biwins)+
∂Ui(vi−bi)
∂vi
∂Pr(biwins)
∂bi
. Since Pr(bi wins) is nonnegative and nondecreasing in bi, Ui(vi− bi) is
nondecreasing in vi, the objective function is supermodular if and only ifUi(vi−bi) is supermodular and in turn if and
only if it is concave (the bidder is risk averse).
22Note that every convex set is contractible since, choosing any point x0 in the set, the function h(τ,x) = (1− τ)x+
τx0 is a contraction. On the other hand, there are contractible sets that are not convex (e.g., any curved line in R2 that
does not intersect itself).
47
others employ monotone bidding function, an appropriate generalization of Kakutani’s theorem –
relying on contractible-valuedness instead of convex-valuedness –can be employed to establish the
existence of monotone PSNE. Although we don’t need the SCC to show the contractibility of best
reply sets, it is needed to show that the monotone best replies exist.
Before we state the result, we need to restate our contest game as follows. For the lattice
terminology, please refer to Appendix. There are N risk-neutral bidders, i = 1,2, ...,N. Bidder i’s
type space is Vi = [v, v¯] endowed with the Euclidean metric, and i’s action space is the topological
space Bi. Bidder i’s bounded and measurable utility function is ui : B×V→R, where B=×Ni=1Bi
and V=×Ni=1Vi. The common prior over the bidders’ types is a probability measure µ on the Borel
subset of V.
Reny imposes the following assumptions to simplify the analysis, which are satisfied in our
contest game. Let µi denote the marginal of µ on Vi. First, for every bidder i, and every Borel
subset A of Vi, he assumes that µi(A) = 0 if A∩C is countable for every subset C in Vi, which
implies that each µi is atomless because we may set A= {vi} for any vi ∈Vi. In our contest games,
each bidder’s type space is [v, v¯] with its usual total order, this assumption holds if and only if µi
is atomless. In particular, this assumption helps ensure the compactness of the bidders’ sets of
monotone pure strategies in a topology in which ex-ante utilities are continuous.
Secondly, he assumes that (Bi,≥) is a compact locally-complete metrizable semilattice, which
holds whenever (Bi,≥) is a compact metrizable semilattice in Euclidean space with the coordinate
partial order. In our contest games, given the action space, Bi = [b, b¯], this assumption is trivially
satisfied.23
Finally, he also assumes the continuity of the utility function, which is satisfied in our contest
games.
A pure strategy for bidder i is a measurable function, βi : Vi → Bi. Such a pure strategy is
monotone if v′i ≥ vi implies βi(v′i)≥ βi(vi).
As before, an N-tuple of pure strategies, (β1, ...,βN) is an equilibrium if for every bidder i and
every pure strategy β′i,
Z
V
ui(β(v),v)dµ(v)≥
Z
V
ui(β′i(vi),β−i(v−i),v)dµ(v) (3.24)
23Reny (2006) actually considers more general setting such as multidimensional type space and action space.
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where the left-hand side, is bidder i’s utility given the joint strategy β, and the right-hand side is
his utility when he employs β′i and the others employ β−i.
It will be helpful to speak of the interim utility to bidder i’s type vi from the bid bi given the
strategies of the others, β−i,
Ui(bi,vi,β−i) =
Z
V
ui(bi,β−i(v−i),v)dµi(v−i|vi) (3.25)
where µi(·|vi) is a version of the conditional probability on V−i given vi.
A set of bidder i’s pure strategies is join-closed if for any pair of strategies, βi,β′i, in the set,
the strategy taking the action βi(vi)∨β′i(vi) for each vi ∈ Vi is also in the set. Now we could state
the existence result. The proof mimics Reny (2006), so is omitted here.
Theorem 7. Suppose that for each bidder i, µi is atomless, and each bidder’s set of monotone best
replies is nonempty and join-closed whenever the others employ monotone pure strategies, then
the contest defined above possesses a monotone pure strategy equilibrium.
Remark 8. This result is more powerful than Theorem 3. The following analysis shows that we
do not need a strong version of the single crossing condition to ensure the nonemptiness of best
response. Actually only a weak single crossing condition will suffice.
In the appendix, we provide the original fixed point theorem Reny uses for his existence result
and show that our contest games satisfies the conditions required in order to apply that theorem.24
It is well-known that within the confines of a lattice, quasisupermodularity and single-crossing
conditions on interim utility functions guarantee the existence of monotone best replies and that
sets of monotone best replies are lattice and hence join-closed. The sufficient conditions on interim
utilities are as follows.
Definition 3. Suppose that for each bidder i, (Bi,≥) is a lattice. The interim utility function Ui is
weakly quasisupermodular if for all monotone pure strategies β−i of the others, all bi,b′i ∈ Bi, and
every vi ∈Vi, Ui(bi,vi,β−i)≥Ui(bi∧b′i,vi,β−i) implies Ui(bi∨b′i,vi,β−i)≥Ui(b′i,vi,β−i).
In our contest games, actions are totally ordered, interim utilities are automatically supermod-
ular, and hence weakly quasisupermodular.25
24Similar material could be also found in Reny (2006).
25Complementarities in the distinct dimensions of a bidder’s own actions are natural economic conditions under
which weak quasisupermodularity holds. However, supermodularity usually requires complementarities between the
actions of distinct bidders, which is not satisfied in many auction games.
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Definition 4. Bidder i’s interim utility functionUi satisfies weak single-crossing if for all monotone
pure strategies β−i of the others, for all bidder i action pairs b′i ≥ bi, and for all bidder i type pairs
v′i ≥ vi, Ui(b′i,vi,β−i)≥Ui(bi,vi,β−i) implies Ui(b′i,v′i,β−i)≥Ui(bi,v′i,β−i).26
If the interim utility functions satisfy these two properties, the following result ensures that a
pure strategy equilibrium exists for the Bayesian contest game.
Corollary 1. Suppose that for each bidder i, µi is atomless, each (Bi,≥) is a lattice, and the
bidders’ interim utility functions are weakly quasisupermodular and satisfy weak single-crossing,
then the Bayesian contest game possesses a monotone pure strategy equilibrium.
3.5 CONCLUSION
This paper studies the imperfectly discriminating contests with incomplete information. Most
existing literature on contest focus on either complete information where every player’s valuation
is common knowledge, or incomplete information but with two players. By studying a general
contest model with incomplete information and N players, we provide the sufficient conditions
under which a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists for both finite-action and continuum-
action contests. The main condition we impose is the Single Crossing Condition that is widely
used in economic literature. Roughly this condition guarantees that when one player adopts a
non-decreasing strategy, there exists a best response for other player that is also non-decreasing.
By applying certain fixed point theorem, we can establish existence of a monotone equilibrium.
However, analytically it is too complex to derive the closed form equilibrium strategies. Future
research may try to use computational or numerical methods to approximate equilibrium strategies.
Using a simple two-bidder example, we confirm the monotonicity of equilibrium strategies and
also derive some numerical results which may be useful for the experimental study of contests.
In particular, with two bidders each having two values, we could fully characterize equilibrium
strategies. We further show that contests with incomplete information is equivalent to contests with
26To ensure the convexity of the set of monotone best replies, Athey (2001) assumesWi satisfies a more stringent
single-crossing condition, which requires that, in addition to the above, the second inequality is strict whenever the
first one is.
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complete information in terms of expected revenue.27 It remains open to characterize equilibrium
strategies for contests with two players each having three or more values.2829
More general results for characterizing equilibrium strategies and their properties need to be
addressed in the future research. It may be also interesting to study agents’ behaviors through
controlled experiments in the laboratory.
27However, this revenue equivalence fails if the contest designer cannot forbid resale. With resale possibility, the
allocation is always ex post efficient. The contest designer could benefit by allowing resale since both bidders bid
more aggressively if they foresee the possibility of resale. See Sui (2006)
28Wa¨rneryd (2003) studies two-player contest with one-sided incomplete information. The prize has common value
that is uncertain to one player. He shows that equilibrium expenditures are lower than that with complete information
or two-sided incomplete information.
29With three values or even continuous private values, there is no incentive-compatible bargaining scheme that could
ensure ex post efficiency. See Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Sui (2006).
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1
A.1 SOME FACTS FROM AFFILIATION
In this section, we prove some useful facts due to affiliation.
Fact 1.
FY1(y|x)
fY1(y|x)
is non-increasing in x.
Proof. Let x< x′ and y< y′. By affiliation inequality, we have
f (x,y) f (x′,y′)≥ f (x,y′) f (x′,y)
Hence
f (x,y)
f (x,y′)
≥ f (x
′,y)
f (x′,y′)
Then we have
fY1(y|x)
fY1(y′|x)
≥ fY1(y|x
′)
fY1(y′|x′)
Integrating with respect to y over [0,y′] yields
FY1(y
′|x)
fY1(y′|x)
≥ FY1(y
′|x′)
fY1(y′|x′)
therefore the result follows.
Fact 2.
fY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|x)
is non-increasing in x.
Proof. By Fact 1,
fY1(y|x)
FY1(y|x)
is non-decreasing in x. Hence,− fY1(y|x)FY1(y|x) is non-increasing in x. Therefore,
the result follows.
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Fact 3. FY1(y|x) is non-increasing in x.
Proof. Fact 1 and Fact 2 imply that
FY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|x)
is non-increasing in x. Hence
1−FY1(y|x)
FY1(y|x)
is non-
decreasing in x. Therefore, 1FY1(y|x)
is non-decreasing in x. The result follows.
A.2 PROOF OF RESULTS
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The necessity is established in Section 3. For sufficiency, let z≤ x, and βs(z) = b. From the
first order condition, we have
∂Π(βs(z),x)
∂b
= v(z,x,z)
fY1(z|x)
1−FY1(z|x)
1
β′s(z)
+
1
β′s(z)
Z z
0
v1(z,x,y)
fY1(y|x)
1−FY1(z|x)
dy−1
≥ v(z,z,z) fY1(z|z)
1−FY1(z|z)
1
β′s(z)
+
1
β′s(z)
Z z
0
v1(z,z,y)
fY1(y|z)
1−FY1(z|z)
−1
=
∂Π(βs(z),z)
∂b
= 0
The first inequality follows from Assumption 1, and the last two equalities follow from the first-
order condition. That means, when X1 = x and bidder 1 bids b= βs(z)≤ βs(x), his expected profit
could be raised by bidding higher. By similar argument, when z≥ x, we can show ∂Π(βs(z),x)∂b ≤ 0.
Consequently,Π(b,x) is maximized at βs(x)= b. SinceΠ(0,x)= 0 for all x, we haveΠ(βs(x),x)≥
0 for all x> 0 by affiliation. Thus, we have shown that βs(x) is the best response strategy for bidder
1 when he observes X1= x and all other bidders j 6= i follow βs, and when resale market participants
believe that all bidders follow βs.
From the above argument, the equilibrium payoff to a bidder who receives a signal of x is
Π(βs(x),x)≥ 0, and thus it is individually rational for each bidder to participate in the auction.
It remains to show that the equilibrium bidding strategy is strictly increasing and differentiable.
Since v1 is positive by affiliation, β′s(x) is strictly positive. Clearly, the equilibrium bidding strategy
is differentiable. Therefore, the bidding strategy we characterize is indeed a symmetric equilibrium
provided Assumption 1 holds.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let x< z. Since Ψ2 > 0, we have that
v(x′,x,y)
fY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|x)
< v(x′,z,y)
fY1(y|z)
1−FY1(y|z)
By Fact 3, FY1(y|x)≥ FY1(y|z) and thus
v(x′,x,y) fY1(y|x)< v(x′,z,y) fY1(y|z)
This proves that Ψ2 > 0 implies that Φ2 > 0. Similar argument could show that Ψ12 > 0
implies Φ12 > 0.
The proof of Lemma 2 is exactly the same as above, so is omitted.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof mimics the proof of Theorem 1. Again the key point is to show ∂Π(b,x)∂b ≥ 0 if
b = β f (x′) ≤ β f (x), and ∂Π(b,x)∂b ≤ 0 if b = β f (x′) ≥ β f (x). Assumption 2 and affiliation ensure
that it is not profitable for local deviation. It is trivial to verify that βs is strictly increasing and
differentiable.
From the above argument, the equilibrium payoff to a bidder who receives a signal of x is
Π(β f (x),x) ≥ 0, and thus it is individually rational for each bidder to participate in the auction.
Similarly, it is easy to show that the equilibrium strategy is increasing and differentiable, hence it
is indeed a symmetric equilibrium for the first-price all-pay auction with resale.
Proof of Theorem 3
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Proof. Let e f (es) denote the expected payment in equilibrium of the first-price (second-price) all-
pay auction. Then we have
es(x) =
Z x
0
βs(y) fY1(y|x)dy+[1−FY1(x|x)]βs(x)
= βs(x)FY1(x|x)−
Z x
0
β
′
s(y)FY1(y|x)dy+[1−FY1(x|x)]βs(x)
= βs(x)−
Z x
0
β
′
s(y)FY1(y|x)dy
=
Z x
0
v(y,y,y)
fY1(y|y)
1−FY1(y|y)
dy+
Z x
0
k(y)dy
−
Z x
0
[v(y,y,y)
fY1(y|y)
1−FY1(y|y)
+ k(y)]FY1(y|x)dy
=
Z x
0
v(y,y,y) fY1(y|y)[
1−FY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|y)
]dy+
Z x
0
k(y)[1−FY1(y|x)]dy
=
Z x
0
v(y,y,y) fY1(y|y)[
1−FY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|y)
]dy+
Z x
0
h(y)[
1−FY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|y)
]dy
≥
Z x
0
v(y,y,y) fY1(y|y)dy+
Z x
0
h(y)dy
= e f (x)
The second equality follows from integration by parts; by Fact 3, we have that FY1(y|x) is non-
increasing in x, so
1−FY1(y|x)
1−FY1(y|y)
≥ 1 for x ≥ y. This gives us the last inequality, which completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. See Krishna and Morgan (1997), proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 2 & 3
Proof. For any given value of X0, β˜ is similar to β, and the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2 mimic the
proofs of Theorem 1 and 2, so are omitted.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider the first-price all-pay auction with resale. Let β˜ f (·,x0) denote the equilibrium
strategy conditional on the revealed of seller’s private information X0 = x0. Lemma 2 and affiliation
ensures that β˜ f (·,x0) is increasing in x0.
Let e f (x,z) denote the expected payment for bidder 1 if he learns his signal as z but he bids
as if it were x, and e˜ f (x,z) = E[β˜ f (x,X0)|Y1 < x,X1 = z]. Affiliation implies that e˜ f2(x,z)≥ 0. Let
R(x,z) denote the expected value of winning. At the equilibrium, it is optimal to choose z= x, the
resulting first-order condition yields
e f1(z,z) = e˜
f
1(z,z)
Since e f2(x,z) = 0, e˜
f
2(x,z)≥ 0, then according to linkage principle, we have e˜ f (z,z)≥ e f (z,z)
since e˜ f (0,0) = e f (0,0) = 0. Therefore, in the first-price all-pay auction with resale, the initial
seller will benefit from publicly disclosing his private signal.
Using similar argument, we can show that the information disclosure by the seller does not
decrease, may increase the expected revenue in the second-price all-pay auction with resale.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2
B.1 PROOFS OF RESULTS
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. From (6), we have
∂EU1(bL,β)
∂bL
=
σβL
(bL+βL)2
vL+
(1−σ)βH
(bL+βH)2
vH−1
Consider the second-order condition, then
∂2EU1(bL,β)
∂b2L
=
−2σvLβL
(bL+βL)3
+
2(σ−1)vHβH
(bL+βH)3
< 0
Similarly, we have ∂
2EU1(bH ,β)
∂b2H
< 0. Therefore, the objective function is globally concave.
Hence, the first-order condition is both necessary and sufficient to characterize the symmetric
equilibrium which is determined by (9) and (10).
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. See Malueg and Yates (2004).
Proof of Proposition 3
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Proof. If the realized values are (vL,vL) or (vH ,vH , it is trivial to show that βLL = vL4 and βHH =
vH
4 . Now let us look at the cases (vL,vH) and (vH ,vL). With resale possibilities, the expected
valuation upon winning is vH for both players, since the low-value player could resell the prize to
his high-value rival with price equal to vH . Therefore, existence of resale possibilities symmetrizes
valuations for both players. It remains easy to show that βLH = βHL = vH4 .
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. See Nti (1999) or Malueg and Yates (2004).
Proofs of Proposition 5 and 6 are contained in the text, so are omitted.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. This is trivial by our equilibrium construction. If the realized valuations for both players
are the same, the final allocation is always efficient. If the low-value player wins the prize, he will
resell it to the high-value rival and the latter will accept the offer in equilibrium. Therefore, the
final allocation is always efficient.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. See Section 6.1.
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. From (9), (10), we have
βH−βL
vH− vL =
σ
4
From Proposition 2, we have
β˜H− β˜L
vH− vL =
σ
4
+
1−σ
(ρ−1/2+ρ1/2)2
From (24), (25), we have
µH−µL
vH− vL =
σ
4
From (30), (31), we have
τH− τL
vH− vL =
σ
4
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 3
C.1 A FIXED POINT THEOREM AND ITS APPLICATION
C.1.1 NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY
Let A be a nonempty set and let ≥ be a partial order on A.1 For a,b ∈ A, if the set {a,b} has a least
upper bound (l.u.b.) in A, then it is unique and will be denoted by a∨ b, the join of a and b. If
every pair of points in A has an l.u.b in A, then we shall say that (A,≥) is a semilattice. Similarly,
we could define the greatest lower bound (g.l.b). If every pair of points in A has both an l.u.b. in A
and a g.l.b. in A, then we shall say that (A,≥) is a lattice. Clearly, in our contest games, the type
space [v, v¯] and action space [b, b¯] are both lattice and hence semilattice.
A topological semilattice is a semilattice endowed with a topology under which the join op-
erator, ∨, is continuous as a function from A×A into A. When the topology on A rendering the
join operator continuous is metrizable we say that (A,≥) is a metrizable semilattice. When the
topology on A renders A compact, we say that (A,≥) is compact.
A semilattice (A,≥) is complete if every nonempty subset S of A has a least upper bound, ∨S,
in A. A topological semilattice (A,≥) is locally complete if for every a ∈ A and every neighbor-
hood U of a, there is a neighborhood W of a contained in U such that every nonempty subset S
of W has a least upper bound, ∨S, contained in U . The proof of Theorem 4 relies on a corol-
lary of Eilenberg and Montgomery’s (1946) fixed point theorem, which substantially generalizes
1That is, ≥ is transitive, refexive and antisymmetric.
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Kakutani’s theorem.
A subset X of a metric space Y is said to be a retract of Y if there is a continuous function
mapping Y onto X leaving every point of X fixed. A metric space (X ,d) is an absolute retract if
for every metric space (Y,δ) containing X as a closed subset and preserving its topology, X is a
retract of Y . Examples of absolute retracts include closed convex subsets of Euclidean space or of
any metric space, and many non convex sets as well.
Theorem 8 (Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946)). Suppose that a compact metric space(X ,d) is an
absolute retract and that F : X  X is an upper hemicontinuous, nonempty-valued, contractible-
valued correspondence. Then F has a fixed point.
Now we use this theorem to sketch the proof of Theorem 4. LetMi denote the set of monotone
pure strategies for bidder i, and let M = ×Ni=1Mi. Let Hi :M−iMi denote bidder i’s best reply
correspondence when bidders are restricted to monotone pure strategies. By hypothesis, each
bidder possesses a monotone best reply when the others employ monotone pure strategies (the
SCC), any fixed point of ×Ni=1Hi :MM is a monotone pure strategy equilibrium. The following
steps demonstrate that such a fixed point exists.
C.1.2 THE Mi ARE COMPACT ABSOLUTE RETRACTS
First we need to show that each bidder’s space of monotone pure strategies can be metrized so that
it is a compact absolute retract. Without loss, we may assume that the metriz dBi on Bi is bounded.
2
Given dBi , define a metric δMi on Mi as follows:
δMi(βi,β
′
i) =
Z
Vi
dBi(βi(vi),β
′
i(vi))dµi(vi) (C.1)
Now suppose that βni is a sequence in Mi. Then, by the semilattice-extension of Helley’s
theorem, βni has a µi almost everywhere pointwise convergent subsequence. That is, there exists a
subsequence, βnki , and βi ∈Mi such that βnki (vi)→k βi(vi) for µi almost every vi ∈ Vi. Therefore,
dBi(β
nk
i (vi),βi(vi)), a bounded function of vi, converges to zero µi almost everywhere as k→ ∞, so
that, by the dominated convergence theorem, δMi(β
nk
i ,βi)→k 0. We hence establish the following
result.
2As Reny (2006) points out that, for any metric, d(·, ·), an equivalent bounded metric is min(1,d(·, ·)).
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Lemma 3. The metric space (Mi,δMi) is compact.
The metric δMi also renders (Mi,δMi) an absolute retract, as stated in the next lemma, whose
proof can be found in Reny (2006).
Lemma 4. The metric space (Mi,δMi) is an absolute retract.
C.1.3 UPPER-HEMICONTUNUITY
The second step is to show that, given the metric δ j on M j, each bidder i’s utility function, Ui :
M→ R, is continuous under the product topology. This immediately yields upper-hemicontinuity
of best reply correspondence. To see utility continuity, suppose that βn is a sequence of join
strategies in M, and that βn → β ∈M. By the following lemma, this implies that for each bidder
i, βni (vi) → βi(vi) for µi almost everywhere vi ∈ Vi. Consequently, βn(v) → β(v) for µ almost
everywhere v∈V . Hence, since ui is bounded, Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem yields:
Ui(βn) =
Z
V
ui(βn(v),v)dµ(v)→
Z
V
ui(β(v),v)dµ(v) =Ui(β) (C.2)
establishing the continuity ofUi.
Lemma 5. In (M,δ), βk converges to β if and only if in (B,≥), βk(v) converges to β(v) for µ almost
every v ∈ [v, v¯].
Since each bidder i’s utility function,Ui, is continuous and each Mi is compact, an application
of Berge’s theorem of the maximum immediately yields the following result.
Lemma 6. Each bidder i’s best reply correspondence, Hi : M−i  Mi, is nonempty-valued and
upper-hemicontinuous.
C.1.4 CONTRACTIBLE-VALUEDNESS
The simple observation at the heart of this approach is that each bidder i’s set of monotone best
replies is contractible. As Reny (2006), we use the following contracting map.
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Define h : [0,1]×Mi×Mi →Mi as follows: for every vi ∈ [v, v¯],
h(τ, f ,g)(vi) =

f (vi), if vi ≤ |1−2τ|(v¯− v)+ v and τ< 1/2
g(vi), if vi ≤ |1−2τ|(v¯− v)+ v and τ≥ 1/2
f (vi)∨g(vi), if vi ≥ |1−2τ|(v¯− v)+ v
(C.3)
Note that h(τ, f ,g) is indeed monotone and h(0, f ,g) = f and h(1, f ,g) = g. The continuity is
established in Reny (2006). The following lemma shows the contractible-valuedness.
Lemma 7. Hi :M−iMi is contractible-valued.
Proof. Fix β−i ∈M−i. To establish the contractibility of Hi(β−i), suppose that f ,g ∈ Hi(β−i). By
hypothesis, Hi(β−i) is join-closed, the monotone function, f ∨g, taking the action f (vi)∨g(vi) for
each vi ∈ [v, v¯] is also in Hi(β−i). Consequently, [h(τ, f ,g)](vi, being equal to either f (vi), g(vi),
or f (vi)∨g(vi), must maximizeUi(bi,vi,β−i) over bi ∈ Bi for almost every vi ∈ [v, v¯], because this
µi almost-everywhere maximization property holds, by hypothesis, for every member of Hi(β−i)
and so separately for each of f ,g, and f ∨ g. But this implies that for every τ ∈ [0,1],h(τ, f ,g) ∈
Hi(β−i). So, because h(0, f ,g) = f ,h(1, f ,g) = g and (·, ·, ·) is continuous as Reny (2006) shows,
h(·, ·,g) is a contraction for Hi(β−i).
C.1.5 COMPLETING THE PROOF
The following lemma completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 8. The product of the bidders’ best reply correspondence, ×Ni=1Hi :MM, possesses a
fixed point.
Proof. By Lemmas 1 and 2, each (Mi,δMi) is a compact absolute retract. Consequently, under
the product topology, M is both compact and, by Borsuk (1966) IV (7.1), an absolute retract. By
Lemmas 4 and 5, ×Ni=1Hi :MM is upper-hemicontinuous, nonempty-valued, and contractible-
valued. Hence, applying Theorem 5 to ×Ni=1Hi :MM yields the desired result.
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